The Impact of Employment Law and Practices on Business and Society: The Significance of Worker Voice by Schipani, Cindy A. et al.
SCHIPANI_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2017 2:53 PM 
 
979 
THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW AND 
PRACTICES ON BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WORKER VOICE* 
Cindy A. Schipani** 
Frances J. Milliken*** 
Terry Morehead Dworkin**** 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 980 
I.  SIGNIFICANCE OF VOICE ........................................................ 982 
A. Theoretical Overview ..................................................... 982 
B. The Impact of Voice ....................................................... 986 
C. Voice and Silence ........................................................... 991 
II.  THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL ........... 998 
A. Historical Underpinnings of the Employment-at-Will 
Doctrine .......................................................................... 998 
B. Application of Employment-at-Will Today.................. 1000 
III.  WHISTLEBLOWING ............................................................... 1007 
A. Efforts to Promote Whistleblowing .............................. 1007 
B. Efforts to Silence Whistleblowing and Voice .............. 1012 
IV.  PROPOSALS FOR WORKPLACE PRACTICES ........................... 1021 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 1023 
 
*Copyright 2017.  Cindy A. Schipani, Frances J. Milliken, Terry Morehead Dworkin.  All 
rights reserved.  The authors wish to thank the participants of the Big 10 Colloquium, 
Professors Leigh Anenson, Dan Cahoy, Wayne Eastman, Kevin Kolben, Gideon Mark, Abbey 
Stemler, and Matthew Turk for their helpful comments.  We also wish to thank Alina 
Charniauskaya, J.D., Julia Xin, J.D., Zachary James, J.D., and Kathleen Knight, J.D. 
Candidate, University of Michigan Law School; and Mateusz Borowiecki, B.A. Candidate, 
University of Michigan, for excellent research assistance. 
**Merwin H. Waterman Collegiate Professor and Professor of Business Law, University of 
Michigan. 
***Arthur E. Imperatore Professor of Entrepreneurial Studies and Professor of Management, 
Stern School of Business, New York University. 
****Wentworth Professor of Business Law, emerita, Indiana University and Scholar in 
Residence, Seattle University School of Law. 
SCHIPANI_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2017  2:53 PM 
980 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19.4 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Time and time again, it has been shown to be important, for both 
business and society, for individuals to speak up when they encounter 
problems or wrongdoing in the workplace.  The scandal at WorldCom broke 
only after employees spoke up and publicly “blew the whistle” on 
executives.
1
  An Enron employee reported problems to the IRS in 1999, long 
before the firm’s failure in 2001 and, some speculate, early enough to avoid 
a total failure of the firm.
2
  In the wake of scandal, Volkswagen offered 
internal immunity to employees who blew the whistle regarding cheating on 
emissions tests and requirements.
3
  In an effort to weed out the wrongdoers 
and put the company on a path toward recovery, Siemens offered immunity 
for whistleblowing employees when a scandal broke in connection with 
massive international bribery.
4
 
Research also demonstrates the importance of employee voice, which 
sometimes takes the form of whistleblowing, for individual employee well-
being.  When employees feel unable to exercise their voice at work, there 
can be serious negative impacts for psychological and physical well-being.
5
  
Despite the negative impact of employee silence for both organizations and 
 
 1. See Susan Pulliam & Deborah Solomon, How Three Unlikely Sleuths Discovered 
Fraud at WorldCom, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1035929943494003751 [https://perma.cc/QEM5-SKYG] 
(offering detailed background on the whistleblowing at WorldCom). 
 2. See David S. Hilzenrath, IRS Pays Enron Whistleblower $1.1 Million, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 15, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/irs-pays-enron-
whistleblower-11-million/2011/03/15/ABFLAEb_story.html [https://perma.cc/X5Y5-
UVQY] (quoting the whistleblower’s lawyer). 
 3. Jack Ewing & Julie Creswell, Volkswagen, Offering Amnesty, Asks Workers to 
Come Forward on Emissions Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/13/business/volkswagen-offering-amnesty-asks-workers-
to-come-forward-on-emissions-cheating.html [https://perma.cc/42V3-D5ZQ]. 
 4. Mike Esterl, Siemens Amnesty Plan Assists Bribery Probe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2008, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120465805725710921 [https://perma.cc/F882-HTSL]. 
 5. See Michael Knoll & Rolf van Dick, Do I Hear the Whistle . . . ? A First Attempt to 
Measure Four Forms of Employee Silence and Their Correlates, 113 J. OF BUS. ETHICS  349, 
353 (2013) (examining the correlation between different forms of employee silence and well-
being); Leslie A. Perlow & Stephanie Williams, Is Silence Killing Your Company?, 81 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 52, 52 (2003) (“[S]ilence can exact a high psychological price on individuals, 
generating feelings of humiliation, pernicious anger, resentment, and the like.”).  See also, 
Michael Knoll & Rolf van Dick, Authenticity, Employee Silence, Prohibitive Voice, and the 
Moderating Effect of Organizational Identification, 8 J. POSITIVE PSYCHOL. 346, 346 (2013) 
(discussing the psychological effects of authenticity and linking authenticity to employee 
voice); Fons Naus et al., Organizational Cynicism: Extending the Exit, Voice, Loyalty and 
Neglect Model of Employees’ Responses to Adverse Conditions in the Workplace, 60 HUM. 
REL. 683, 683-685 (2007) (suggesting that a company culture that encourages employees to 
be engaged will have a positive impact on employees’ well-being). 
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employees, the reality is that there are often a number of serious barriers to 
speaking up in the workplace, including risking potential negative 
employment repercussions, such as termination.
6
 
The risk of termination is especially realistic in jurisdictions where 
employment-at-will is the legal norm.  Employment-at-will gives employers 
and employees the right to terminate employment at any time, with or 
without reason, provided the reason is not illegal, without legal 
consequence.
7
  In the United States, employment-at-will is the applicable 
legal standard when there is not an employment contract, such as a collective 
bargaining agreement, executive contract, or other specific contract terms 
granting employment for a specific period of time.
8
  There are exceptions to 
the doctrine,
9
 but the reality is that most employment in the United States is 
at-will.
10
 
In addition, employee protections provided by collective bargaining 
agreements may be on the decline.  The U.S. Supreme Court recently heard 
the case of Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, in which a 
mandatory payment of union dues was at issue.
11
  The Court ultimately 
deadlocked on the issue, and thus the ruling of the lower court permitting 
mandatory union dues stands.12  Yet some fear that the protection of unions 
will be a relic of the past if the Supreme Court decides in a later case that 
assessment of mandatory union dues is unconstitutional.13  Twenty-eight 
 
 6. E.g., Elizabeth W. Morrison, Employee Voice Behavior: Integration and Directions 
for Future Research, 5 ACAD. OF MGMT. ANNALS 373, 383 (2011) (discussing negative 
personal outcomes as one of numerous barriers to speaking up in the workplace); Frances J. 
Milliken et al., An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don’t 
Communicate Upward and Why, 40 J. OF MGMT. STUD. 1453, 1469 (2003) (explaining that 
fear of negative labels is one cause of employee silence in the workplace). 
 7. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. 
J. OF LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976) (discussing how employment-at-will can be terminated 
with notice); Lobosco v. N.Y. Tel. Co./NYNEX, 96 N.Y. 2d 312, 312 (2d Cir. 2001) (denying 
an employees’ motion to dismiss despite his claim that he was being retaliated against for 
blowing the whistle); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (Deering 2016) (stating that employees in 
California may be terminated at will). 
 8. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: TERMINATION §§ 
2.01-2.02 (AM. LAW. INST. 2015). 
 9. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, Ch. 259, §§ 259.03-259.06 (Matthew Bender). 
 10. Id. at § 259.02. 
 11.  Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188995, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec 5, 2013) (ordering judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant, who compelled 
employees to support a specific collective bargaining agreement), aff’d by, Friedrichs v. Cal. 
Teachers Ass’n, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24935 (9th Cir. Cal. Nov. 18, 2014); Luis v. U.S., 
136 U.S. 1083 (2016). 
      12. Id. 
 13.  The U.S. Supreme Court  granted certiorari in Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, No.: 16-1466, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4459 (cert. 
granted Sept. 28, 2017).  This case presents another challenge to the constitutionality of 
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states
14
 and the territory of Guam
15
 have already established “right-to-work” 
laws declaring the compulsory joining of unions illegal, and U.S. federal 
government employees also have a similar protection.
16
 
This paper argues that the current legal environment may negatively 
impact employees’ willingness to exercise their voice in the workplace.  To 
benefit the firm, the employees, and society, employers must adopt practices 
that provide employees a safe place to exercise their voice, despite the 
restrictive legal environment in which employees work.  To this end, this 
paper connects the literature on employee voice and silence to the 
employment law presumptions about at-will employment, examining the 
negative impact these presumptions may have on employee voice.  The paper 
then proposes that employers implement effective avenues for employee 
voice and internal whistleblowing, which allow employees to trust that their 
concerns will be heard, and suggests that doing so will provide positive 
benefits to both the firm and society. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Part I discusses the importance and 
role of employee voice, as well as some of the negative consequences 
associated with stifling voice.  Part II discusses the legal environment of 
employment-at-will in the United States, which may play a large part in 
repressing employee voice.  In Part III, the significance, benefits, and perils 
of whistleblowing as an aspect of voice are discussed and analyzed, and 
recent efforts to restrict whistleblowing are critiqued.  Part IV continues with 
proposals for positive business practices to encourage worker voice followed 
by our concluding remarks. 
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF VOICE 
A. Theoretical Overview 
The current research on employee voice spans across a variety of fields 
and topic domains, some of which are developing independently of each 
other.
17
  Research that focuses on employee voice comes from a variety of 
sources including the literatures on organizational behavior, industrial 
relations (IR), and human resource management (HRM).  More specifically, 
 
mandatory union agency fees.    
 14.  Right to Work Frequently-Asked Questions, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. 
FOUND., http://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked-questions/ 
[https://perma.cc/85Q8-FAXU] (last visited May 10, 2017).  
 15.  See 22 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 4101-4114 (2000) (prohibiting employers from 
requiring union participation).  
 16.  5 U.S.C. § 7102 (1978). 
 17.  Michael R. Bashshur & Burak Oc, When Voice Matters:  A Multilevel Review of the 
Impact of Voice in Organizations, 41 J. MGMT. 1530, 1531 (2015). 
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employee voice is considered an important factor in research on justice, 
proactive/prosocial work behavior, decision-making, and feedback.
18
 
Three primary research streams can be said to dominate research on 
voice.  One stream, deriving from Albert Hirschman’s work, Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty, views employee voice as a constructive response to dissatisfaction 
and alienation in the workplace.
19
  Another more nascent research stream 
contends that voice is not necessarily a result of dissatisfaction; rather, it is 
an other-oriented behavior intended to promote the effective functioning of 
the organization.
20
  Finally, more recent research on employee silence 
similarly views employee voice as a constructive behavior aimed at helping 
organizations solve problems, but it focuses on understanding some of the 
systemic obstacles to engaging in voice from an employee’s perspective. 
1. Voice to Communicate Dissatisfaction 
Although it has declined in popularity,
21
 the Exit/Voice/Loyalty/
Neglect (EVLN) model—an extension of Hirschman’s “exit/voice/loyalty” 
model—still illuminates the analyses of employee voice in the industrial 
relations and human resource management fields.
22
  The model 
conceptualizes voice as one of four response categories to dissatisfaction or 
alienation in the workplace:  (1) exit, (2) voice, (3) loyalty, and (4) neglect.
23
  
Exit and voice are both active methods of communicating dissatisfaction; 
voice is constructive and thus preferable to exit, which is considered 
destructive and inefficient.
24
  Loyalty and neglect are passive responses:  
loyalty reflects hope of recovery whereas neglect accepts that recovery is not 
possible.
25
  In the workplace, neglect can be manifested in a variety of 
 
 18. Id. at 1542-45. 
 19. E.g., Hsin-Hua Hsiung, Authentic Leadership and Employee Voice Behavior: A 
Multi-Level Psychological Process, 107 J. BUS. ETHICS 349, 350 (2012) (noting two separate 
streams of employee voice research, including the Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect research 
and extra-role-behavior research). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Elizabeth W. Morrison, Employee Voice and Silence, 1 ANN. REV. 
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. & ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 173, 176 (2014) [hereinafter 
Employee Voice and Silence] (noting the history of research of voice and silence). 
 22. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1536 (noting an analysis of HRM and ILR on 
the results of the effect of unionized voice on job attitude). 
 23. See generally Dan Farrell, Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect as Responses to Job 
Dissatisfaction: A Multidimensional Scaling Study, 26 ACAD. MGMT. J. 596 (1983) 
(discussing a study that focuses on workers’ responses to job dissatisfaction). 
 24. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984) 
(conducting studies that find that individuals in unions keep their jobs longer than those who 
are not in unions). 
 25. Id. 
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negative behaviors, including a lack of apparent interest or motivation, an 
increase in mistakes, absenteeism, and exploiting an organization’s time for 
personal affairs.
26
  The belief is that allowing employees to exercise their 
voice can improve the situation that is the cause of the employee alienation 
or dissatisfaction, and employees will subsequently become more satisfied 
with working conditions and less likely to quit the organization.
27
  When the 
opportunity for voice is lacking but employees do not have the option to quit, 
they tend to withdraw and slip into neglect. 
Proponents of this model tend to operationalize voice in terms of the 
presence or absence of formal and informal voice mechanisms.  Although 
the most commonly studied manifestation of voice mechanisms in this 
literature is union representation,
28
 other examples of voice mechanisms 
include grievance filing, whistleblowing, informal complaints, and 
participation in suggestion systems.
29
 
2. Voice Mechanisms as an Opportunity to Create Perceived Justice 
In the organizational justice context, opportunities for employee voice 
are viewed as a desirable structural feature of organizational procedures and 
policies that provides employees with a perceived chance to express their 
views to decision-makers.
30
  Research on “process control,” or the voice 
effect, has been particularly influential in the study of employee voice.
31
  
Process control was first observed by Thibault and Walker in their studies of 
dispute resolution in legal settings.  They found that perceived control over 
the procedures that led to decisions made the procedures seem more fair, 
 
 26. Caryl E. Rusbult et al., Impact of Exchange Variables on Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and 
Neglect: An Integrative Model of Responses to Declining Job Satisfaction, 31 ACAD. MGMT. 
J. 599, 601 (1988). 
 27. See generally FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 24 (theorizing that unionized 
individuals will be less likely to quit because grievance procedures provide a voice 
mechanism).  Empirical studies have provided some support for this theory.  See Derek R. 
Avery et al., Does Voice Go Flat? How Tenure Diminishes the Impact of Voice, 50 HUM. 
RESOURCE MGMT. 147 (2011) (finding a negative relationship between union presence and 
employee turnover); Roderick D. Iverson & Douglas B. Currivan, Union Participation, Job 
Satisfaction, and Employee Turnover: An Event-History Analysis of the Exit-Voice 
Hypothesis, 42 INDUS. REL. 101 (finding a negative relationship between union presence and 
employee intentions to quit). 
 28. See generally sources cited at supra notes 17-26. 
 29. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1532 (outlining voice in management research 
and outcomes). 
 30. Robert J. Bies & Debra L. Shapiro, Voice and Justification: Their Influence on 
Procedural Fairness Judgments, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 676, 676 (1988). 
 31. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1532 (outlining studies on process control and 
noting that process control is otherwise known as voice effect). 
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regardless of actual outcome.
32
  Other studies have also found a positive 
relationship between process control and the perceived fairness of 
outcomes.
33
 
Perhaps one of the most well-known models of procedural justice is the 
“group value” model, which suggests that people value their membership in 
groups because groups “offer symbols of identity, economic resources, and 
a way of validating behavior.”
34
  Fair procedures make members of the group 
feel valued.
35
  Employee voice opportunities are thus positively linked with 
outcomes because they reduce uncertainty, increase individuals’ felt control 
over the processes that lead to outcomes, and make individuals feel like 
valued members of the organization.
36
 
3. The Pro-Social Conceptualization of Employee Voice 
The proactive work behavior literature conceptualizes voice as a 
behavior, rather than in terms of the presence of voice-granting mechanisms 
or perceived voice opportunities.
37
  Central to this research stream is the idea 
that the underlying motivation for employee voice is pro-social in nature.
38
  
That is, employee “[v]oice is motivated by the desire to bring about 
constructive change for the organization or for one or more stakeholders.”
39
  
An employee is therefore more likely to engage in voice behaviors to the 
extent that she has a strong desire or sense of obligation to help the 
organization operate more effectively or appropriately via its employees, 
clients, or the external community.
40
  As noted by Professor Morrison, 
empirical studies have provided support for this idea by “showing a 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Yochi Cohen-Charash & Paul E. Spector, The Role of Justice in Organizations: A 
Meta-Analysis, 86 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 278, 284-86 
(2001); Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25 
years of Organizational Justice Research, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425, 436 (2001). 
 34. Stefanie E. Naumann & Nathan Bennett, A Case for Procedural Justice Climate: 
Development and Test of a Multilevel Model, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 881, 881 (2000). 
 35. See generally Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in 
Groups, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992) (noting the social 
psychology of procedural justice). 
 36. Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1532-33. 
 37. Thomas W.H. Ng & Daniel C. Feldman, Employee Voice Behavior: A Meta-Analytic 
Test of the Conservation of Resources Framework, 33 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 216, 217 
(2012). 
 38. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 180. 
 39. Id. at 179-80; see also Linn Van Dyne & Jeffrey A. LePine, Helping and Voice Extra-
Role Behaviors: Evidence of Construct and Predictive Validity, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 108, 109 
(1998) (defining voice as a “promotive behavior that emphasizes expression of constructive 
challenge intended to improve rather than merely criticize.”). 
 40.  Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 180. 
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relationship between employee voice and a variety of internal motivational 
states reflecting a sense of commitment to the well-being of one’s 
organization, coworkers, or customers.”
41
  
Many scholars in this area also conceive of voice as a type of 
organizational citizenship behavior.
42
  But unlike some other organizational 
citizenship behaviors, voice is often seen as challenging rather than 
affiliatory, especially to managers and particularly when it is aimed at 
disrupting the status quo.
43
 Furthermore, voice can only have positive effects 
when it reaches a target with the power to take action; this contrasts with 
other organizational citizenship behaviors, which generally do not require 
approval or action from above to have positive effects.
44
  Thus, engaging in 
voice involves an element of personal risk for an employee, who may 
jeopardize her relationships with colleagues and supervisors by engaging in 
voice. 
B. The Impact of Voice 
Employee voice opportunities have been linked to numerous positive 
psychological, relational, and health-related outcomes.  For the individual 
employee, the positive outcomes associated with perceiving that one has 
opportunities to “voice” one’s concerns in the workplace include improved 
justice perceptions, better job attitudes, and increased satisfaction at work.
45
  
Positive outcomes such as team learning, improved work processes and 
innovation, and even crisis prevention have been observed at the unit and 
organizational levels.
46
  Further, the suppression of voice behaviors and the 
perceived lack of voice opportunities can create feelings of stress, loss of 
control and loss of self-efficacy.
47
 
Paradoxically, no significant correlation has been found between voice 
behaviors and objective performance (including both financial performance 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., James R. Detert et al., Voice Flows to and Around Leaders: Understanding 
When Units Are Helped or Hurt by Employee Voice, 58 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 624, 626 (2013) 
(“Voice is a challenging, prosocial, organizational citizenship behavior specifically intended 
to be instrumental in improving the organization by changing existing practices.”). 
 43. Subrahmaniam Tangirala & Rangaraj Ramanujam, Exploring Nonlinearity in 
Employee Voice: The Effects of Personal Control and Organizational Identification, 51 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1189, 1192 (2008). 
 44. Id. at 1191. 
 45. Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1531. 
 46. Jian Liang et al., Psychological Antecedents of Promotive and Prohibitive Voice: A 
Two-Wave Examination, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 71, 73 (2012). 
 47. E. W. Morrison & F. J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier to Change and 
Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 706, 721 (2000). 
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and productivity rates),
48
 although some empirical studies
49
 suggest that 
when voice is heard but ignored, employee output substantially decreases.
50
  
One reason why there may be no observed positive relationship between 
voice behavior and objective performance measures is that the relationship 
is likely to be complex.  That is, the relationship between voice behaviors 
and outcomes such as financial performance is likely to be both mediated 
and moderated by a number of factors, including the nature of the voice both 
in terms of content and delivery, the degree of management openness to the 
voice efforts, the reactions to the voicing attempt, whether the problem is 
solved, and the felt outcomes of voice for the employee.  Also, mediating the 
relationship between voice and performance outcomes are more proximal 
outcomes of voice such as its effects on employee well-being, employee 
commitment, and the degree of trust across levels of the hierarchy. 
1. Psychological Well-Being 
Voice, whether characterized as a behavior or in terms of the 
availability of voice mechanisms, has been positively associated with 
numerous facets of psychological well-being, such as job satisfaction, 
outcome satisfaction, and organizational commitment.
51
  Furthermore, 
employee satisfaction has been shown to increase when a greater number of 
voice mechanisms are available.52 
Many of the positive individual-level attitudinal and behavioral effects 
 
 48. Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1534. 
 49. See Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 188 (discussing studies that show 
how employee voice being ignored can be detrimental and comparing Scott E. Seibert et al., 
What do Proactive People Do? A Longitudinal Model Linking Proactive Personality and 
Career Success, 54 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 845 (2001) with Steven W. Whiting et al., Effects 
of Task Performance, Helping, Voice and Organizational Loyalty on Performance Appraisal 
Ratings, 93 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 125 (2008)).  
 50. See James E. Hunton et al., A Field Experiment Examining the Effects of Membership 
in Voting Majority and Minority Subgroups and the Ameliorating Effects of Postdecisional 
Voice, 81 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 806 (1996) (describing a field study using eighty employees to 
examine the consequences of membership in voting majority and minority subgroups after 
trying to fix the negative outcome of the minority subgroup’s decision). 
 51. See Colquitt et al., supra note 33, at 436 (finding a positive relationship between voice 
opportunities and outcome satisfaction, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment); 
Jeffrey P. Thomas et al., Employee Proactivity in Organizations: A Comparative Meta-
Analysis of Emergent Proactive Constructs, 83 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL 
PSYCHOL. 275, 289 (2010) (finding a positive relationship between informal voice behaviors 
and job satisfaction and affective organizational commitment); Ng & Feldman, supra note 37, 
at 221 (finding a negative relationship between informal voice behaviors and affective 
detachment from the organization and organizational disidentification). 
     52.  But see, e.g., Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1536 (noting that many studies report 
a negative relationship between union representation and dissatisfaction). 
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of voice can be linked to an individual’s perception of personal control.  In 
the organizational justice literature, the availability of opportunities to 
provide input has been closely linked with an employee’s sense of personal 
control in the workplace.
53
  In this context, personal control is defined as an 
employee’s subjective belief in “her ability to effect a change, in a desired 
direction, on the environment.”
54
  Given the amount of time people spend at 
work,
55
 it is unsurprising that employees wish to see themselves as active 
members of the organization, rather than passive cogs in the machine.
56
  By 
voluntarily engaging in change-oriented behaviors, employees are able to 
assert their sense of personal control.
57
  In contrast, lack of personal control 
is associated with an assortment of detrimental individual outcomes, such as 
dissatisfaction, stress, decreased performance, withdrawal symptoms, 
destructive tendencies, and even sabotage.
58
 
Organizational justice scholars have also found a positive relationship 
between voice opportunities and perceived fairness; employees who 
perceive that they have input into procedures and outcomes are likely to view 
such procedures and outcomes as fairer.
59
  If employees have more 
opportunities to provide work-related input, they have a greater sense of 
control, which increases the expectancy of effectively resolving workplace 
problems and issues through personal action.
60
  They may also feel more like 
valued members of the organization if they perceive that they are treated 
fairly at the workplace.
61
  It is important, however, that voice opportunities 
be legitimate; when employees’ voices are heard but ignored, dissatisfaction 
 
 53. In organizational justice literature, “process control” is near-synonymous with the 
ability to provide input in the procedures that lead to outcomes.  See, e.g., Colquitt et al., supra 
note 33, at 426-28 (defining process control as a perception of procedural fairness). 
 54. David B. Greenberger & Stephen Strasser, Development and Application of a Model 
of Personal Control in Organizations, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 164, 165 (1986). 
 55. In 2015, people who worked spent an average of 7.6 hours per day on work and work-
related activities.  American Time Use Survey—2015 Results, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (June 24, 
2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D2W-
CGCN]. 
 56. Richard DeCharms, PERSONAL CAUSATION: THE INTERNAL AFFECTIVE 
DETERMINANTS OF BEHAVIOR at 274 (1968); Greenberger & Strasser, supra note 54, at 426, 
435. 
 57. Blake E. Ashforth & Alan M. Saks, Personal Control in Organizations: A 
Longitudinal Investigation with Newcomers, 53 HUMAN REL. 311, 327-28 (2000). 
 58. Greenberger & Strasser, supra note 54, at 164. 
 59. Cohen-Charash & Spector, supra note 33, at 284-86. 
 60. Jerry B. Fuller et al., Promoting Felt Responsibility for Constructive Change and 
Proactive Behavior: Exploring Aspects of an Elaborated Model of Work Design, 27 J. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1089, 1091 (2006); Sharon K. Parker et al., “That’s Not My Job”: 
Developing Flexible Employee Work Orientations, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 899, 903-04 (1997). 
 61. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, 
at 173-202 (1988). 
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increases,
62
 and productivity decreases.
63
 
Employees who consciously suppress their work-related thoughts, 
opinions, and suggestions because they believe that will not be valued may 
experience cognitive dissonance;
64
 they believe that they have something 
important to express, but by remaining silent, their behavior is at odds with 
that belief.
65
  Employees experiencing cognitive dissonance are predicted to 
be in a state of emotional tension, which increases stress and exacerbates 
stress-related outcomes.  To resolve this dissonance, either their lack of voice 
or their beliefs must change, but as mentioned, the perceived risks associated 
with voicing their concerns create a significant barrier to engaging in voice 
behaviors.
66
  As a result, an employee is more likely to resolve dissonance 
by reducing her belief about the importance of the issue she wishes to speak 
about, disassociating from the organization, or viewing herself as being a 
person who holds little influence, leading to “neglect” in the words of the 
EVLN model.
67
 
2. Relationships 
Constructive voice behaviors signal employee commitment and 
concern for the organization.  According to social exchange theory, 
managers should recognize and reward employees who express voice.
68
  
However, studies tying voice behaviors to relational outcomes have 
produced less uniformly positive results.
69
  In reality, individuals may not be 
so receptive to input—particularly when it is perceived as criticism from 
someone lower in the organizational hierarchy.  Recent studies suggest that 
the impact of voice depends on the content of the message and how it is 
communicated.  For example, Steven Whiting and colleagues found that 
 
 62. Robert Folger et al., Effects of “Voice” and Peer Opinions on Responses to Inequity, 
37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2253, 2254-55 (1979). 
 63. A field experiment placed eighty employees into voting majority and minority 
subgroups.  In the absence of post-decisional voice, members of the minority subgroup 
perceived the decision as less fair and produced forty-one percent less output than members 
of the voting majority subgroup.  See Hunton et al., supra note 50, at 806 (investigating the 
role of post-decisional voice to improve attitudinal differences and performance). 
 64. Id. 
 65. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 9-14 (1957). 
 66. Morrison & Milliken, supra note 47, at 721. 
 67. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1547 (explaining that neglect is an outcome of 
an employee who feels that her voice has been ignored). 
 68. Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1533. 
 69. See Steven W. Whiting et al., Effects of Message, Source, and Context on Evaluations 
of Employee Voice Behavior, 97 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 159, 159 (2012) (citing evidence to 
support the finding that voice leads to slower salary growth and a reduced likelihood of 
promotion). 
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employers perceive voice more positively when it provides a solution, it is 
given early in the process, it comes from a person who is viewed as 
trustworthy and an expert in the relevant area, and there is a norm for 
speaking up in the organization.
70
  Employees who are able to effectively 
regulate their emotions while engaging in voice also receive better 
performance evaluations.
71
  In contrast, a 2001 study found a negative 
relationship between proactive voice and career progression; the authors 
argued that employees whose proactive voice focuses on problems without 
providing innovative solutions may damage their workplace relations and, in 
turn, their own careers.
72
 
Thus, providing employees with perceived voice opportunities has been 
hypothesized and often found to have positive consequences for employees 
in terms of their perceptions of control and fairness and resulting sense of 
commitment to the organization.  However, managers are often less positive 
in their judgments of employees who exercise the opportunity to speak up 
about sources of dissatisfaction or even suggestions for improvement. 
3. Health 
Although the impact of voice on health-related outcomes has not been 
rigorously tested,
73
 related studies on stress suggest that stifling voice may 
also have serious psychological and physical health effects.
74
  In 1979, 
Robert Karasek first observed that personal control (as measured by latitude 
in decision-making) moderates the relationship between work and stress.
75
 
Feelings of work-related unfairness, work-related dissatisfaction, lack of 
trust in the organization,
76
 and the suppression of work-related emotions
77
 
have all been described as examples of occupational stressors and strains. 
Research provides abundant evidence that high levels of workplace 
stress are likely to lead to health problems, increased likelihood of accidents, 
and burnout.
78
  Further, workplace stress may increase absenteeism, result in 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Adam M. Grant, Rocking the Boat but Keeping it Steady: The Role of Emotion 
Regulation in Employee Voice, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1703, 1709 (2013). 
 72. Seibert et al., supra note 49, at 864-68. 
 73. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 179. 
 74. Robert Karasek, Job Demands, Job Decision Latitude, and Mental Strain: 
Implications for Job Redesign, 24 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 285, 302-04 (1979). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Ng & Feldman, supra note 37, at 221. 
 77. See, e.g., JAMES W. PENNEBAKER, OPENING UP: THE HEALING POWER OF EXPRESSING 
EMOTIONS 9 (1997) (describing the suppression of emotions as a stressor that has mental and 
physical health implications). 
 78. James B. Avey et al., Psychological Capital: A Positive Resource for Combating 
Employee Stress & Turnover, 48 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 677, 679 (2008). 
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reduced productivity at work, and result in destructive patterns in the context 
of work.
79
  Stress-induced medical conditions include bodily pains, 
dizziness, headaches, heart disease, asthma, and hypertension.
80
  Chronic 
stress may weaken an individual’s immune system and induce a state in 
which the body no longer has the capacity to adapt to stress, leading to high 
blood pressure, heart attacks, chronic fatigue, psychosis, and symptoms of 
depression.
81
  Studies of workplace-related stress have shown that employees 
experiencing chronic stress may develop physical symptoms (such as 
unstable blood pressure, muscle tension, and headaches) and psychological 
symptoms (such as the decreased ability to concentrate and retain 
information, substance abuse, and clinical depression).
82
  Stress may also 
exacerbate existing medical conditions,
83
 particularly in the case of chronic 
stress.
84
  Once ill, stress also makes recovery from illness more difficult.
85
  
The adverse health effects of workplace stress are reflected in increasingly 
high individual and organizational health care costs.
86
  A 2016 study focusing 
on workplace stressors found that 120,000 deaths per year and five to eight 
percent of annual healthcare costs may be attributable to how U.S. 
companies manage their employees.
87
 
C. Voice and Silence 
Voice is conceptualized differently across literatures.  Early work on 
employee voice characterized it as a constructive response to work-related 
dissatisfaction; employees who are unhappy with their jobs may voice their 
concerns, exit the organization, or remain hopeful that work conditions will 
change.
88
  More recently, scholars have tended to describe voice as a 
 
 79. Thomas W. Colligan & Eileen M. Higgins, Workplace Stress: Etiology & 
Consequences, 21 J. WORKPLACE BEHAV. HEALTH 89, 93 (2006). 
 80. Id. at 91. 
 81. Id. at 92. 
 82. Id. at 93. 
 83. See, e.g., Beverly E. Thorn et al., A Randomized Clinical Trial of Targeted Cognitive 
Behavioral Treatment to Reduce Catastrophizing in Chronic Headache Sufferers, 8 J. PAIN 
938, 946-48 (2007) (finding that sufferers experienced fewer chronic headaches after 
suppressing stress-causing behaviors). 
 84. How Stress Affects Your Health, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, 
http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/stress-facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF3G-67ME] (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2016). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Colligan & Higgins, supra note 79, at 96 (linking workplace stress to increased 
cost of benefits to the employer). 
 87. Joel Goh et al., The Relationship Between Workplace Stressors and Mortality and 
Health Costs in the United States, 62 MGMT. SCI. 608, 608 (2016). 
 88. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 24, at 247 (finding that the voice that unionism 
provides to its members serves as a source of both social and economic good). 
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behavior that is informal, extra-role, and pro-social.
89
  Voice has been 
defined as “the informal and discretionary communication by an employee 
of ideas, suggestions, concerns, or information about problems . . . to 
persons who might be able to take appropriate action, with the intent to bring 
about improvement or change.”
90
  For our purposes, voice may be expressed 
informally, or via mechanisms such as grievance procedures or union 
membership.  Silence, on the other hand, refers to the withholding of 
information from persons perceived to be able to take appropriate action.
91
  
It is important to note that silence is not merely the absence of voice, as “not 
speaking up can occur for many reasons, including having nothing 
meaningful to convey.”
92
  Similarly, the presence of voice behaviors does 
not imply the absence of intentional silence.
93
 
Although scholars have taken different approaches to operationalizing 
and explaining employee voice, most agree on two matters:  first, employee 
voice is beneficial;
94
 and second, employees who are presented with a “latent 
voice opportunity”—that is, employees who possess potentially relevant or 
important work-related knowledge, opinions, concerns, or ideas
95
–often 
choose to remain silent.
96
  Next, we analyze the inhibitors of employee voice 
and motivators of employee silence. 
1. Barriers to Voice 
In a recent study, 461 individuals were asked to describe occasions 
when they had intentionally stayed silent in response to an important work-
related issue and their motives for doing so.
97
  The most frequently expressed 
motivations for silence were that they “did not think it would do any good to 
 
 89. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 174. 
 90. Frances J. Milliken et al., Linking Workplace Practices to Community Engagement: 
The Case for Encouraging Employee Voice, 29 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 405, 409-10 
(2015) (quoting Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 174). 
 91. Craig C. Pinder and Karen P. Harlos, Employee Silence: Quiescence and 
Acquiescence as Responses to Perceived Injustice, 20 RES. IN PERS. AND HUM. RESOURCES 
MGMT. 331, 334 (2001); Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 174. 
 92. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 174. 
 93. Chad T. Brinsfield, Employee Silence Motives: Investigation of Dimensionality and 
Development of Measures, 34 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 671, 672 (2013). 
 94. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 177. 
 95. Id. at 179. 
 96. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Silenced by Fear: The Nature, Sources, and 
Consequences of Fear at Work, 29 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 163, 165 (2009) 
(“Employees frequently remain silent in moments that call for voice, whether about matters 
relating to employee treatment . . . managerial behavior . . . or the outbreak and spread of 
corporate scandal.”). 
 97. Brinsfield, supra note 93, at 674. 
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speak up,” wished to avoid conflict, and feared negative consequences.
98
  
These motivations echo findings from previous employee interviews and 
surveys regarding employee voice, which appear to corroborate two 
principles:  first, many employees are hesitant to speak up about work-related 
issues; and second, the two primary perceptions that inhibit voice are the fear 
of negative consequences at the workplace and doubts about the utility of 
engaging in voice.
99
  Of course, whether an employee does engage in voice 
will likely be influenced by a wide variety of factors, including individual 
dispositional idiosyncrasies such as self-esteem, extraversion, and 
neuroticism.
100
  However, two key influencers of the “voice choice,” 
perceived risk and utility, are common across individuals.
101
 
a.   Risk 
Engaging in change-oriented voice is risky because it inherently 
involves a challenge to the status quo.  An employee may fear that by 
speaking up in a way that challenges work practices and decisions or that 
highlights a serious problem, she will be viewed as a troublemaker or 
complainer, lose respect or support from others at work, and face negative 
 
 98. See id. at 676 (listing the frequency of given reasons for remaining silent per 
participants’ open-ended responses). 
 99. For a concise summary of surveys regarding employees’ reluctance to engage in 
voice and their rationales for not doing so, see Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 
178.  In particular, a 1991 study found that over seventy percent of employees surveyed felt 
afraid to speak up about certain issues.  Id. 
 100. Empirical studies in the pro-social behavior literature have identified a wide variety 
of dispositional and attitudinal factors as antecedents to, or moderating variables affecting, 
employee voice.  See, e.g., Joel Brockner et al., The Moderating Effect of Self-Esteem in 
Reaction to Voice: Converging Evidence From Five Studies, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 394, 404 (1998) (analyzing self-esteem); Fuller et al., supra note 60, at 1090-91 
(focusing on felt obligation for constructive change); Liang et al., supra note 46, at 71 
(examining psychological safety, felt obligation for constructive change, and organization-
based self-esteem); J. Michael Crant et al., Dispositional Antecedents of Demonstration and 
Usefulness of Voice Behavior, 26 J. BUS. PSYCHOL. 285, 285 (2010) (defining the dimensions 
of personality in the Five-Factor model: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism); Subrahmaniam Tangirala et al., Doing Right Versus Getting 
Ahead: The Effects of Duty and Achievement Orientations on Employees’ Voice, 98 J. APPL. 
PSYCHOL. 1040, 1047 (2013) (discussing duty and achievement orientation).  Note that these 
studies focused primarily on these individual factors as antecedents of voice, but in most 
studies, voice could just as easily be the predictor.  Individual traits have also been linked to 
usage of voice mechanisms.  See, e.g., Michael Frese et al., Helping to Improve Suggestion 
Systems: Predictors of Making Suggestions in Companies, 20 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 
1139, 1150 (1999) (focusing on self-efficacy and work-initiative predictors of suggestion 
system usage); see also Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 179-80 (discussing 
several studies). 
 101. Milliken et al., supra note 6. 
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job consequences (such as getting passed over for promotions or being 
fired).
102
  In the corporate hierarchical setting, leaders and supervisors and 
the relationships they have with employees play particularly significant roles 
in the risk assessment.
103
  This may be explained in part by the power 
imbalances inherent in hierarchical structures.  Because higher-ups have 
power over subordinates’ pay, promotions, work assignments, and continued 
employment, employees will be particularly wary of jeopardizing 
relationships with them.
104
 
Even if leaders display openness to input and willingness to address 
concerns, employees may hold implicit, automatically-applied beliefs about 
the riskiness of speaking up within a hierarchy.
105
  For example, employees 
may subconsciously “intuit” that embarrassing one’s boss will result in 
negative consequences.106 This may occur even if supervisors are objectively 
approachable and open to input.
107
 
The perceived riskiness of speaking up is heightened when voice is 
critical; for example, when the thoughts or opinions at issue are critical of 
“existing or impending practices, incidents, or behaviors that may harm their 
 
 102. See Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 179 (explaining that avoiding 
negative consequences is a primary reason for avoiding expression of employee voice). 
 103. See, e.g., Karen Harlos, If You Build a Remedial Voice Mechanism, Will They Come? 
Determinants of Voicing Interpersonal Mistreatment at Work, 63 HUM. REL, 311, 324 (2010) 
(finding that relative hierarchical power is one of the key determinants in deciding whether 
employees use formal voice mechanisms). 
 104. See, e.g., Isabel C. Botero & Linn Van Dyne, Employee Voice Behavior: Interactive 
Effects of LMX and Power Distance in the United States and Colombia, 23 MGMT. COMMC’N 
Q. 84, 98 (2009) (analyzing the positive relationship between leader-member exchange and 
voice); James R. Detert & Ethan R. Burris, Leadership Behavior and Employee Voice: Is the 
Door Really Open? 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 869, 870 (2007) (investigating transformational 
leadership and managerial openness); James R. Detert & Linda K. Trevino, Speaking Up to 
Higher Ups: How Supervisor and Skip-Level Leaders Influence Employee Voice, 21 ORG. SCI. 
249, 267 (2010) (noting that even the skip-level leaders may influence employees’ decisions 
to exercise voice); Amy C. Edmondson, Speaking Up in the Operating Room: How Team 
Leaders Promote Learning in Interdisciplinary Action Teams, 40 J. MGMT. STUDIES 1419, 
1142-44 (2003) (looking at the effectiveness of team leader actions on voice in an 
interdisciplinary context); Wu Liu et al., I Warn You Because I Like You: Voice Behavior, 
Employee Identifications, and Transformational Leadership, 21 LEADERSHIP Q. 189, 191 
(2010) (assessing the characteristics of voice behavior and whom employees are most likely 
to speak out and speak up to); see also Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 180-82 
(discussing the literature on the efficacy and safety of workplace voice). 
 105. See Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 183 (describing the learned origins 
of implicit beliefs). 
   106.   See id. (citing James R. Detert & Amy C. Edmondson, Implicit Voice Theories: Taken-
for-Granted Rules of Self-Censorship at Work, 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 461, 461 (2011) (detailing 
the reluctance to voice concerns upward because of possible negative personal 
consequences)). 
 107. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 183. 
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organization . . . ,”
108
 or when they relate to perceived mistreatment.
109
  
Critical voice is riskier because “pointing out dysfunction more directly 
implies the failure of important stakeholders in the workplace.”
110
  Ambitious 
individuals may be particularly disinclined to voice a concern for fear that 
doing so would jeopardize their career.
111
  This is troubling because critical 
voice serves important diagnostic and preventative functions for 
organizational health by drawing attention to previously undetected 
problems and flaws in organizational initiatives.
112
  Liang and colleagues 
suggest that in certain settings, critical voice may be even more impactful 
than positive, “promotive” voice because developing and implementing new 
initiatives is costly and time-consuming, particularly for fast-paced 
organizations, whereas “prohibitive” voice may more efficiently place a 
stopper on losses.
113
 
b. Utility 
Because of the risks involved in speaking up at work, employees are 
unlikely to engage in voice if they perceive that doing so will be 
ineffective.
114
  When group- or organization-level beliefs emphasize the 
value of voice, individuals’ use of voice will be greater.
115
  An individual 
 
 108. Id.; Liang et al., supra note 46, at 72 (also comparing “promotive” voice to 
“prohibitive” voice).   
 109. See generally Rusbult et al., supra note 26 (finding that informal voice behaviors 
addressing perceived mistreatment are more likely when the employee has alternative 
employment opportunities); see also Klaas et al, infra note 118, at 322. 
 110. Liang et al., supra note 46, at 85. 
 111. See generally Tangirala et al., supra note 100 (indicating, through an empirical study, 
that duty orientation and employee voice are positively related, whereas achievement 
orientation and employee voice are negatively related). 
 112. See Liang et al., supra note 46, at 75 (describing the important function of prohibitive 
voice by putting undetected problems on the company’s radar). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Studies in the organizational justice realm demonstrate that while voice opportunity 
has a positive impact on employee attitudes and behaviors, voice that is heard, but ignored, 
has detrimental effects on employee attitudes and behaviors.  See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 
17, at 1534 (citing a study that found that heard but ignored voice resulted in a forty-one 
percent decrease in output as compared to when voice was acted upon). 
 115. See Elizabeth W. Morrison et al., Speaking Up in Groups: A Cross-Level Study of 
Group Voice Climate and Voice, 96 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 183, 188 (2011) (relating group-level 
beliefs about the value of voice to individual use of informal voice); Desmond J. Leach et al., 
The Effectiveness of Idea Capture Schemes, 10 INT’L J. INNOVATION MGMT. 325, 341 (2006) 
(finding that use of nonmonetary rewards and recognition may help validate participation in 
formal mechanisms like suggestion systems); Cecilia Rapp & Jörgen Eklund, Sustainable 
Development of a Suggestion System: Factors Influencing Improvement Activities in a 
Confectionary Company, 17 HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS IN MANUFACTURING & SERV. 
INDUSTRIES 79 (2007) (finding that use of suggestion systems is positively related to publicity 
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who perceives making constructive suggestions to be part of her prescribed 
work role is also more likely to engage in voice.
116
  On the other hand, 
employees are more likely to remain silent when there exists a shared group-
level perception that speaking up is futile.
117
  Group-level attitudes toward 
voice also impact the use of voice mechanisms such as suggestion systems.
118
  
Employees are less willing to use suggestion systems when managers are 
indifferent; they are more willing to do so when the organization possesses 
a “learning culture.”
119
  “Research examining the use of formal grievance 
process to address perceived mistreatment has shown that employees are 
influenced by factors likely to affect the relative attractiveness of this form 
of voice over other possible responses,”120 such as the availability of labor 
market alternatives, and factors that are likely to increase the cost of 
alternative responses.
121
 
c.  Managerial Attitudes 
Employees’ fears and skepticism regarding higher-ups’ receptiveness 
to subordinate input are not without basis.  According to Morrison, a recent 
series of studies suggest that when voice is seen as challenging the status quo 
rather than supporting it, managers are more likely to regard the employee 
as disloyal and threatening, and as a result, they are less likely to endorse the 
message; further, they are more likely to rate employees who engage in 
“prohibitive” voice as poor performers.
122
  Morrison and Milliken assert that 
 
campaigns designed to highlight the need for employees to improve organizational processes 
through the use of such mechanisms). 
 116. See Linn Van Dyne et al., In-Role Perceptions Buffer the Negative Impact of Low 
LMX on Helping and Enhance the Positive Impact of High LMX on Voice, 93 J. APPL. 
PSYCHOL. 1195, 1195 (2008) (finding that regarding voice as an in-role behavior amplifies 
the effect of high-quality leader-member exchange relationships on voice). 
 117.  Morrison & Milliken, supra note 47, at 707 (detailing one of the reasons employees 
do not speak up is belief that it will make no difference). This is supported by a study linking 
upward, informal voice behaviors with perceptions regarding personal influence within the 
work group. See Vijaya Venkataramani & Subrahmaniam Tangirala, When and Why Do 
Central Employees Speak Up? An Examination of Mediating and Moderating Variables., 95 
J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 582 (2010) (finding a positive relationship between work-flow centrality 
and voice behavior, with personal influence moderating this relationship). 
 118.  See Brian Klaas et al., The Determinants of Alternative Forms of Workplace Voice: 
An Integrative Perspective, 38 J. MGMT. 314, 320 (2012) (detailing that in instances with 
group-level beliefs that highly value voice, individual use of voice is greater). 
 119.  See id. at 319 (stating suggestion system use is lower when there is a perception that 
managers are indifferent to the suggestions and respond slowly). 
 120.    Id. at 319-20. 
 121.  Id. at 321. 
 122. See Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 188, (concluding that employers 
are apt to label an employee that challenges them as “rebellious”). 
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managers’ implicitly held beliefs and attitudes play a large part in shaping 
organizational “climates of silence.”
123
  People (managers in this case) often 
feel threatened by negative feedback and try to avoid receiving or absorbing 
it by employing defensive mechanisms, such as questioning the credibility 
of the source or dismissing the criticism as inaccurate.
124
  Managers may feel 
a particularly strong need to avoid embarrassment, threat, and feelings of 
vulnerability, even if they genuinely wish to be receptive to input.
125
  
Negative feedback from subordinates is particularly unwelcome, and is 
likely to be seen as less legitimate and more threatening compared to 
feedback from above.
126
  Recent studies indicate that managers may perceive 
employees who constantly express challenging voice as offensive, hostile, or 
disloyal.
127
 
Moreover, managers are likely to hold a number of implicit beliefs 
about their subordinates and themselves that make them even more inclined 
to discredit change-oriented input from employees.
128
  First, managers often 
assume that employees are: (1) motivated by self-interest and (2) effort-
averse and, therefore, will not, without motivation, seek the best interests of 
the organization.
129
  Second, managers may believe “management knows 
best,” and that “hired hands should put up or shut up.”
130
  Third, managers 
often think that consensus is healthy and dissent is unhealthy.
131
  The 
hierarchical structure of corporate organizations undergirds these beliefs; the 
further people progress upward within an organization, the less likely they 
are to identify with those below them.
132
   
 
 123. See Morrison & Milliken, supra note 47, at 708 (explaining how the climate of silence 
is created by fear of top management from receiving negative feedback from subordinates).  
 124. See id. (describing the ways managers try to deflect criticism).  
 125. Id.  
 126. See id. (detailing the intricacy of receiving feedback from subordinates). 
 127. Ethan R. Burris et al., Speaking Up Versus Being Heard: The Dimensions of 
Disagreement Around and Outcomes of Employee Voice, 24 ORGANIZATIONAL SCI. 22, 25 
(2013) (describing how managers see employees who complain excessively as deceitful or 
hostile). 
 128. See Morrison & Milliken, supra note 47, at 708 (reporting on the implicit beliefs on 
managers). 
 129. See id. at 708-10 (explaining two of the implicit beliefs are that employees are (1) 
self-interested and (2) effort averse). 
 130. W. Charles Redding, Rocking Boats, Blowing Whistles, and Teaching Speech 
Communication, 34 COMM. ED. 245, 250 (1985).  See also Michael J. Glauser, Upward 
Information Flow in Organizations: Review and Conceptual Analysis., 37 HUM. REL. 613, 
614 (1984) (“[P]ervasive management ideology implies that managers direct, control, and 
reward, while subordinates accept responsibilities and follow through.”). 
 131. Morrison & Milliken, supra note 47, at 710 (viewing consensus as healthy and 
discord as unhealthy). 
 132. See Seymour Lieberman, The Effects of Changes in Roles on the Attitudes of Role 
Occupants, 9 HUM. REL. 385, 385 (1956) (describing how a person’s view will be impacted 
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As a result, it is easy to show how voice that was intended to benefit the 
organization may easily be misinterpreted as “unacceptably challenging 
authority, rocking the boat, merely complaining and wasting time . . . or 
showing off and not being a team player.”
133
 
Next, this manuscript identifies ways in which the legal environment 
may also stifle voice.  To this end, Part II discusses typical employment 
relationships in the United States followed in Part III with an analysis of 
whistleblowing laws. 
II. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL 
In every U.S. state, private employment is presumed to be “at will.”
134
  
Generally, unless an employment contract specifies otherwise, an employee 
can be fired without cause.  Likewise, an employee can leave a job for any 
reason without being subject to liability.
135
  The lack of job security created 
by the employment-at-will standard may serve as a systemic barrier to 
exercising voice in and out of the workplace. 
A. Historical Underpinnings of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine 
The English common law rule and American practice in the nineteenth 
century largely converged by enforcing employment contracts of a fixed 
duration and disallowing premature termination without cause.
136
  The main 
point of departure between the United States and English rules was the 
treatment of employment contracts of indefinite length. 
This English rule, construing a hiring of an indefinite length to be for a 
 
by his role in the social system). 
 133. Detert et al., supra note 42, at 628. 
 134. See generally Charles J. Muhl, Monthly Labor Review: The Employment-at-will 
Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, BUREAU LAB. STAT (2001), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AKV-DA8M].  The 
U.S. fits the stereotype of “American Exceptionalism” very well in this regard because it is 
the only industrialized country in the world to be guided by employment-at-will.  Ronald B. 
Standler, History of At-Will Employment Law in the USA, (2000) (citing Daniel A. 
Mathews, Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 
HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1447 n.54 (1975)), http://www.rbs2.com/atwill.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H2NW-XUFB]. 
 135. See Muhl, supra note 134, at 3 (defining at-will to mean that it is terminable by either 
party for any reason). 
 136. See Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the 
United States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85, 102-03 (1982) 
(stating how in the nineteenth century American courts followed the example of English 
common law for enforcing contracts of fixed duration). 
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year,
137
 was thought to protect servants (and the communities, who under 
English poor laws, were responsible for maintaining their poor) from being 
discharged during the lulls of the planting and harvesting season while also 
protecting masters from servants leaving during the busy periods.
138
 
Under the traditional view of the history of at-will employment in the 
United States, the states followed the substance of the English rule
139
 before 
a seismic shift in the late-nineteenth century following the publication of the 
influential legal treatise, Horace G. Wood’s Master and Servant.  After this 
shift, employment without a set duration was prima-facie terminable at the 
will of either party.
140
 
While some scholars doubt the importance of Wood’s treatise,
141
 the 
United States Supreme Court emphatically adopted the at-will rule in 
1908.  In Adair v. United States,
142
 the Court reviewed the constitutionality 
of Section 10 of the Act of Congress of June 1, 1898.  Section 10, which 
protected an employee’s ability to join unions,
143
 was struck down on the 
grounds that it interfered with an employer’s personal liberty and right of 
property under the Fifth Amendment.
144
  Seven years later, the Supreme 
Court struck down a similar state statute under the 14th Amendment, 
explaining that the statute interferes with the right to contract, a protected 
property right.
145
 
 
 137. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413. 
 138. See Feinman, supra note 7, at 120 (detailing the history of the principle and giving 
an example with planting and harvest seasons). 
 139. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of 
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 67 (2000). 
 140. See, e.g., Payne v. W. & A.R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (ruling that 
termination at will not give rise to a legal wrong). 
 141. Some scholars present evidence that Wood’s rule was not immediately accepted by 
all the states.  See, e.g., Summers, supra note 139, at 67 (referencing a New York Court of 
Appeals case that did not immediately accept Wood’s rule).  Other scholars doubt the 
influence of Wood’s treatise in precipitating the adoption of the employment-at-will doctrine.  
Furthermore, historians have evidence that a number of states were not applying the English 
annual hiring rule long before Wood’s treatise.  As early as 1853, Georgia was not applying 
the English rule.  See Henderson v. Stiles, 14 Ga. 135 (1853) (commenting that where an 
employment contract has no specified time, an employee may recover unpaid labor wages on 
a theory of quantum meruit; the annual hiring presumption of the English rule is not 
mentioned).  Even after Wood’s treatise, only one-third of states cited Wood for their adoption 
of their respective at-will rules between 1880 and 1900.  Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding 
Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. 
L. REV. 679, 697 (1994). 
 142. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
 143. Section 10 of the Act of Congress of June 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 424, ch. 370. 
 144. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. at 176. 
 145. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13 (1915).  These cases fall in line with the other 
cases striking down interference with the right to contract under substantive due process 
during the so-called Lochner-era.  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding 
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Beginning in the mid-1930’s, the original version of the at-will rule met 
its demise.  Exceptions to the doctrine began to rise precipitated by the 
passage and subsequent judicial interpretation of the National Labor 
Relations Act, which gave employees the right to self-organize and join labor 
unions.
146
  Today, the high courts of forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia recognize some modern variant of the at-will employment rule.
147
 
B. Application of Employment-at-Will Today 
Despite “at-will” having the connotation of “for any reason,” modern 
American law acknowledges that even at-will employees cannot be fired for 
literally any reason.  The at-will presumption is just that—a presumption.  
Laws and contracts may alter the presumption and legal rules may limit its 
application.  Two broad categories of exceptions to the at-will doctrine exist:  
those based on statutes and those based on common law.  These categories 
are discussed next. 
 
that a statute establishing maximum hours for bakers was unconstitutional under the “general 
right to make contract in relation to [one’s] business [which is] part of the liberty of the 
individual protected by the [Fourteenth] Amendment. . . .”).  The influence of laissez-faire 
economics evident in the Lochner-era, is often put forth as a reason for the abandonment of 
the English rule.  See Jacoby, supra note 136, at 92-93 (indicating the impact laissez-faire 
theories impacted court’s rulings).  Additionally, the rise of the at-will rule coincides well 
with industrialization, so some legal historians posit a causal relationship.  These historians 
reason that the more familial master-servant relationship increasingly became replaced by 
impersonal, commercial employment relationships, where employers no longer were expected 
to take on the responsibility of ensuring their employee’s job security.  See, e.g., Feinman, 
supra note 7, at 123 (comparing the original conception of the master-servant relationship as 
a domestic relationship with the later attitude that the master-servant relationship was a 
commercial one).  There are challengers to this belief though.  See, e.g., Morriss, supra note 
141, at 703 (finding that the rule spread from the West and South to East and did not cover a 
majority of the population until the mid-1890’s, well after many of the significant labor 
struggles stemming from capital and labor had taken place); id. at 682, 697, 745 (finding that 
the rise of the at-will rule is best correlated with the rise of elected judges; thus, the scholar 
hypothesized that the reason behind adoption of the rule must lie with the court as an 
institution, perhaps judicial desire for a simple rule or to keep decisions from going to a jury).  
See also Feinman, supra note 7, at 131-34 (claiming the rule was promoted by the 
“capitalists,” who were combatting legal challenges by an emerging professional class and 
wanted to shift the risk of economic downturns to employees by being able to discharge them 
during downturns). 
 146. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that an 
employer cannot use the right to discharge employees to “intimidate or coerce its employees 
with respect to their self-organization and representation. . . .”). 
 147. Restatement of Empl. L. § 2.01 (“Montana is the only U.S. state to have enacted a 
statute requiring a showing of “good cause. . . .”). 
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1.  Statutory Exceptions to Employment-at-Will 
Numerous federal statutes limit an employer’s ability to freely 
discharge an employee.  Some of these statutes relate to the exercise of 
employee rights:  For example, an employer cannot discharge or take other 
adverse actions based on an employee’s exercise of protected concerted 
activities,
148
 refusal to take part in activities that are reasonably believed to 
be in violation of any law,
149
 exercise of rights related to wage-and-hour 
standards,
150
 exercise of rights secured by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act,
151
 or request for leave under the Family and Medical Leave 
Act.
152
  Other statutes deal with discharge related to certain characteristics of 
an individual employee.  Employers are prohibited from discharging an 
employee on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, national origin,
153
 age,
154
 
pregnancy,
155
 or disability.
156
  Federal statutes also protect employees that 
report, or assist in investigations of, employers’ violations of federal acts 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
157
 wage violations,
158
 health and safety 
violations,
159
 or violations under the Clean Air Act
160
 and Water Pollution 
Control Act.
161
  States also have their own statutes that limit at-will 
employment.
162
 
Finally, a number of states have enacted statutes protecting employees 
from discharge based on lawful activity outside of the workplace.
163
  For 
 
 148. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-169 (1947). 
 149. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1985). 
 150. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2016). 
 151. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1151 (1974). 
 152. Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (2008). 
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). 
 154. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1985), amended by 
P.L. 104-208 §119 (1997). 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1964). 
 156. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990), amended by P.L 
110-325 (2008). 
 157. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010). 
 158. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2016). 
 159. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (1985). 
 160. 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1977). 
 161. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1948). 
 162. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1 (1975) (barring termination as the result of an 
employee bringing an action against their employer to recover workers’ compensation 
benefits or filing notice of violation of a safety rule); MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 9-1105 
(West 1991) (barring termination as the result of an employee bringing an action against their 
employer to recover workers’ compensation benefits or filing notice of violation of a safety 
rule); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1640 (1979) (barring employee discharge or negative action due 
to jury duty). 
 163. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (Deering 1999) (permitting claims for loss of 
wages from demotion, suspension, or discharge for non-working hour lawful conduct away 
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example, Connecticut protects employees who exercise certain federal and 
state constitutional rights provided the “activity does not substantially or 
materially interfere with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the 
working relationship between the employee and the employer.”
164
  New York 
goes beyond this and protects employees who engage in legal “recreational 
activities,” including legal use of consumable products, provided the 
activities are outside work hours, off of the employer’s property, and do not 
involve the employer’s equipment or property.
165
  Most state statutes 
protecting employees for lawful activity outside of work contain exceptions 
for activity related to work or to the employer’s business interests.
166
 
2.  Common Law Exceptions to Employment-at-Will 
Much more complicated than the statutory exceptions to the at-will 
presumptiondsf are the common law exceptions.  These judicially-created 
exceptiofadsns can be generally classified into three categories; those based 
on (a) implied contract, (b) the covenant of good faith, and (c) public policy. 
a. Implied-in-Contract Exception 
The implied-in-contract exception establishes a breach of contract 
 
from employer’s property); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2007) (permitting claims for 
loss of wages from demotion, suspension, or discharge for non-working hour lawful conduct 
away from employer’s property); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 1983) (prohibiting 
discipline or discharge based on an employee’s exercise of rights guaranteed by first 
amendment, so long as such activity does not materially interfere with the employee’s job 
performance); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 1993) (outlawing certain employment 
actions in relation to various legal activities outside employment duties); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 14-02.4-03 (West 2015) (outlawing certain employment actions in relation to various 
legal activities outside employment duties); see also Aaron Kirkland, “You Got Fired? On 
Your Day Off?!”: Challenging Termination of Employees for Personal Blogging Practices, 
75 UMKC L. REV. 545, 546 (2006) (“[S]ix states have enacted exceptions to the at-will 
presumption, making it more difficult for an employer to terminate an employee for off-duty 
conduct.”). 
 164. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 1983); see also Terry Morehead Dworkin, 
It’s My Life – Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job Employee Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 47 (1997) (describing Ford Motor Company’s “sociological department,” which 
monitored employees to make sure they led clean lives). 
 165. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 1993). 
 166. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2007) (protecting lawful activity off an 
employer’s premises during nonworking hours unless it “[r]elates to a bona fide occupational 
requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and 
responsibilities of a particular employee . . .”); see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03 
(West 2015) (protecting “lawful activity off the employer’s premises during nonworking 
hours which is not in direct conflict with the essential business-related interests of the 
employer.”). 
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where an employer fires an employee when the circumstances surrounding 
the employment relationship dictate that the employee was not terminable 
at-will.  This exception is commonly applied in cases involving written 
employer policies, such as employment manuals, which can contain 
provisions that limit the employer’s power to discharge an employee.
167
 
Even without express provisions, certain provisions can amount to an 
implied contract that limits the at-will doctrine.
168
  For example, in Toussaint 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,
169
 the Michigan Supreme Court 
ruled that the employer’s employee manual and guidelines, which specified 
that employees would only be terminated for just-cause, created an implied 
contract overcoming the at-will presumption.
170
  Some states have gone as 
far as to imply that an employer’s creation of an atmosphere of job security 
is sufficient to overcome the at-will employment presumption.
171
  
Furthermore, oral assurances of job security may also be sufficient to 
overcome the presumption of employment-at-will.
172
  Only thirteen states do 
 
 167. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154 (2003) (holding that an employee 
handbook may convert an employment at will relationship into one only terminable by the 
terms of the handbook). 
 168. See, e.g., Cisco v. King, 205 S.W. 3d 808, 810 (Ark. App. 2005) (finding that 
employees terminated without cause are entitled to damages where their employment manual 
stated that “the tenure of an employee with permanent status shall continue during good 
behavior and satisfactory performance . . .”); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 
622, 626-628 (Minn. 1983) (holding that the general language regarding high job security of 
the “Job Security” section of an employee handbook was “no more than a general statement 
of policy” but the “Disciplinary Policy” was an offer creating an implied contract overcoming 
the at-will presumption because it set out in definite language an offer of a unilateral contract 
for procedures to be followed in job termination); Aberle v. City of Aberdeen, 718 N.W.2d 
615, 621 (S.D. 2006) (stating that a policy or handbook providing exclusive grounds for 
employee discipline or discharge amounts to an implied contract binding the employer to a 
for-cause termination procedure when the language is not merely precatory or explicitly 
disclaims any deviation from at-will employment). 
 169. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613-15 (1980) (stating 
that an employee’s reliance on a provision in the employee manual stating that discharge 
would be for just cause only established an implied contract rebutting the at-will 
presumption). 
 170. Id. at 614. 
 171. See, e.g., Bulman v. Safeway, Inc., 27 P.3d 1172, 1175 (Wash. 2001) (“[I]f an 
employer, for whatever reason, creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with 
promises of specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to 
remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, those promises are enforceable 
components of the employment relationship.” (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 
Wn.2d 219, 230 (Wash. 1984))). 
 172. See, e.g., Murphy v. Grower Serv. Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61006, at *8 (E.D. 
Mich. Aug. 17, 2006) (“In order for oral statements of job security to overcome the 
presumption of employment at-will, they must be clear and unequivocal.” (citing Rowe v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 437 Mich. 627, 473 N.W.2d 268, 275 (Mich. 1991))); Ehrhardt v. 
Electr. & Instrumentation Unlimited, 220 F.Supp.2d 649, 655 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (“For an oral 
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not recognize the implied-contract exception.
173
  Employers today often 
carefully word their handbooks and other materials given to employees and 
typically include disclaimers, thus largely avoiding claims of this kind. 
b.  Implied Covenant of Good-Faith and Fair-Dealing 
Under the good-faith and fair-dealing exception, a court will read the 
implied covenant of good-faith and fair-dealing into every employment 
relationship.
174
  This exception has been interpreted to mean either:  (1) that 
terminations motivated by malice or made in bad faith are prohibited, or (2) 
that employer personnel decisions are subject to a just-cause standard.
175
 
California courts were among the first to recognize the good-faith 
exception.
176
  In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
177
 the California appellate 
court acknowledged a terminated employee’s eighteen years of service for 
the employer airline company in holding that the employee could only be 
fired for good cause.
178
  The court stated that the employee’s termination 
after such a long period of employment offended the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.
179
  Interestingly, the court noted the importance 
of reading in the implied duty in order to “ensure social stability in our 
society.”
180
  Delaware courts applied the covenant of good-faith and fair-
dealing in an at-will employment situation with regard to an employer’s “bad 
faith or unfair dealing achieved by deceit or misrepresentation . . . to create 
 
contract to exist, ‘the employer must unequivocally indicate a definite intent to be bound not 
to terminate the employee except under clearly specified circumstances.’” (citing 
Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998))); Schipani v. 
Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 612-25 (1981) (denying a motion to dismiss on a breach 
of contract claim because, even though plaintiff had signed an agreement noting his 
employment was at-will, later assurances were deemed to possibly amount to an implied 
contract); Troy v. Rutgers, 774 A.2d 476, 482 (N.J. 2001) (“Oral promises . . . have been held 
to give rise to an enforceable obligation on the part of an employer.”). 
 173. Muhl, supra note 134, at 4 (listing Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and 
Virginia as states not recognizing the implied-contract exception); see also, Parker v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 725-26 (1982) (stating that an employee’s subjective 
understanding or expectations alone are not sufficient grounds to create an implied contract 
that overcomes the at-will presumption). 
 174.  Muhl, supra note 134, at 10. 
 175.  See id. (citing Shane and Rosenthal, EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK, § 16.03[8] 
(1999)). 
 176. Id. at 10. 
 177. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443 (1980). 
 178. Id. at 455-56. 
 179. Id. at 455. 
 180. Id. 
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fictitious grounds to terminate employment.”
181
  The covenant was first 
recognized in Idaho where an employer dropped an employee to part-time 
for using above-average sick-leave days although the employee had not used 
all her accrued sick leave.
182
 
The vast majority of states reject the good-faith and fair-dealing 
exception to at-will employment.
183
  According to a Florida court in Catania 
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
184
 inquiring into an employer’s motivation behind 
the termination of an employee is too great of a task for the court to 
undertake.
185
  Several other courts have elaborated that acknowledging a 
good-faith exception to the at-will presumption would essentially transform 
the presumption to one of for-cause.
186
  The only states to recognize the good-
faith exception are Alabama,
187
 Alaska,
188
 Arizona,
189
 California,
190
 
 
 181. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 443-44 (Del. 1996) 
(holding that if a jury believed that an employer mounted a false campaign to discredit an at-
will employee who criticized him, such campaign resulting in the employee being fired, the 
termination would amount to being in bad faith). 
 182. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 749 (Idaho 1989) (“[A]ny action by 
either party which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the employment 
contract is a violation of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing which we 
adopt today.”). 
 183. See Muhl, supra note 134, at 4 (listing the only states to recognize the good-faith 
exception as: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, 
Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming); see, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. 
Supp. 2d 623, 643 (E.D. Pa. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 352 F.3d 107 (3d 
Cir. 2003), as amended, (Jan. 20, 2004) (noting that Pennsylvania does not recognize the good 
faith and fair dealing exception to the at-will employment doctrine); O’Reilly v. Physicians 
Mut. Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 644, 649 (Colo. App. 1999) (declining to reconsider the dismissal of 
a claim for breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing); Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790 
N.E.2d 753, 755-56 (N.Y. 2003) (recognizing the good faith and fair dealing exception only 
where it is consistent with agreed upon contract terms); Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 
613 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Iowa 2000) (recounting the erosion of the at-will employment 
doctrine); City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. 2000) (declining to impose 
a duty of good faith and fair dealing in police employment case). 
 184. 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
 185. Id. at 267. 
 186. See, e.g., Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 324 (Ct. App. 1980) 
(recognizing that reading in a good-faith exception would transform an at-will contract “into 
a hybrid contract under which the employee cannot be discharged unless his work is 
unsatisfactory or his services are no longer needed.”). 
 187. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.2d 725, 738 (Ala. 1987). 
 188. Becker v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 355 P.3d 1110, 1116-17 (Alaska 2014). 
 189. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 383 (1985). 
 190. Foley v. U.S. Paving Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 499, 505 (Ct. App. 1968). 
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Delaware,
191
 Idaho,
192
 Massachusetts,
193
 Montana,
194
 Nevada,
195
 Utah
196
 and 
Wyoming.
197
  
c. The Public Policy Exception 
Based on common law tort theories, the public policy exception is the 
most prevalent exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
198
  This 
exception protects employees from termination that would be contrary to 
federal or state public policy.
199
 
Many states expand this doctrine beyond wrongful discharge to also 
cover wrongful demotion or other significant job-related detriment in 
contravention of public policy.
200
  For example, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Connecticut found that a teacher, who was also the teachers’ 
union president, was protected from an unpaid suspension following the 
teacher being “quoted in a newspaper article criticizing the school district’s 
reimbursement of administrators’ advanced degrees.”
201
  The public policy 
exception has yet to be extended to a wrongful refusal to hire.
202
 
 
 191. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 440-44 (Del. 1996). 
 192. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 626-28 (1989). 
 193. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 672 (1981). 
 194. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 184-85 (1982). 
 195. K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (1987). 
 196. Berube v. Fashion Ctr., 771 P.2d 1033, 1046-47 (Utah 1989). 
 197. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Com., 868 P.2d 211, 220 (Wyo. 1994). 
 198. Labor and Employment Law, Ch. 259, § 259.05 (Matthew Bender); Mark A. 
Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will-When Should Courts Defer to 
the Legislature, 72 NEB. L. REV. 956, 958 (1993) (citing Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will 
and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497, 497 (1992)); Brad Seligman, At-Will Termination: 
Evaluating Wrongful Discharge Actions, TRIAL, Feb. 1983, at 60, 61); Muhl, supra note 134, 
at 4. 
 199. See, e.g., Cummins v. Mold-In Graphic Sys., 2001 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2 
(2001), rev. denied, 38 P.3d 12 (Ariz. 2002) (explaining that Arizona public policy can be 
found in federal laws); see also Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 45 P.3d 1162, 1169 (Cal. 2002) 
(relying, in part, upon the federal Constitution to determine public policy).  But see Radicke 
v. Fenton, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2362 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2001) (explaining that Pennsylvania 
law does not recognize federal statutes or regulations as statements of public policy). 
 200. See, e.g., Glover v. NMC Homecare, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Kan. 2000) 
(recognizing that the tort of retaliatory discharge as a public policy exception to the at-will-
employment doctrine extends to retaliatory demotion), aff’d, 13 Fed. Appx. 896 (10th Cir. 
2001); see also Trosper v. Bag ‘N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704, 706 (2007) (extending the public 
policy exception to demotion in addition to discharge). 
 201. Valenti v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., 601 F. Supp. 2d 427, 432 (D. Conn. 2009). 
 202. See, e.g., Berrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 696 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (“An 
employee’s right to be hired or rehired . . . has never been recognized as actionable, under 
common law on public policy grounds.”); Fontaine v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 633 F. 
Supp. 2d 530, 540 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“[T]here is no cause of action under Ohio law for 
retaliation or for wrongful failure to hire in violation of public policy.”). 
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Some state courts, including Alabama, Georgia, and New York, heavily 
disfavor or decline to create public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine 
and rather leave the creation of such exceptions to the state legislatures.
203
  
Other jurisdictions recognize a judicially created public policy exception but 
limit it.
204
  Yet other state judiciaries apply the public policy exception 
comparatively broadly.  Utah’s Supreme Court applied this exception to at-
will employees of Wal-Mart who were discharged for exercising their right 
to self-defense when a confrontation with shoplifters became physical, 
despite Wal-Mart’s policy requiring employees to withdraw from potentially 
violent situations.
205
  The Supreme Court of New Jersey similarly allowed a 
claim of wrongful discharge violating claim against public policy when an 
employee, who was also a municipal council member, voted for an ordinance 
that was against the employer’s interest and was subsequently discharged.
206
 
The exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine provide important 
opportunities for employees to be able to find their voice in organizations.  
In many ways though, the common law exceptions have been supplanted by 
a new crop of legislative attempts to encourage whistleblowing.  The next 
part, Part III, discusses the need to provide voice for whistleblowers, the 
legislative initiatives to accomplish this, and recent efforts by others to stifle 
the voice of whistleblowers. 
III. WHISTLEBLOWING 
A. Efforts to Promote Whistleblowing 
The widespread adoption of whistleblowing legislation and popular 
acceptance of the idea today is a result of a long history of legislators’ desires 
to get employees to speak up to stop fraud and wrongdoing within 
organizations and government, to facilitate law enforcement, and to protect 
public health and safety.
207
  The first legislative enactments coincided with 
 
 203. Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 759 (N.Y. 2003) (“We have consistently 
declined to create a common-law tort of wrongful or abusive discharge . . . grounded in a 
conception of public policy into employment contracts . . . .”); Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum 
Corp., 528 S.E.2d 238, 239-40 (2000) (“Although there can be public policy exceptions to the 
doctrine, judicially created exceptions are not favored, and Georgia courts thus generally defer 
to the legislature to create them.”); Howard v. Wolff Broad. Corp., 611 So. 2d 307, 312 (1992) 
(affirming that the court, thus far, declines to recognize public policy exceptions to at-will 
employment and leaves the creation of such exceptions to the legislature). 
 204. See, e.g., Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 781 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. App. 
1989) (finding that the “narrow” public policy exception was held not to apply to an employee 
reporting illegal act but only to employees who refuse to perform an illegal act). 
 205. Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614, 617, 636 (2015). 
 206. MacDougall v. Weichert, 677 A.2d 162, 167 (1996). 
 207. See Norman D. Bishara et al., The Mouth of Truth, 10 NYU J.L. & BUS. 37, 39 (2013) 
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the beginning of the court-created exceptions to employment at-will that are 
discussed above.
208
  These statutes, passed after some calamity, banned 
retaliation.  The presumption was that people within the organization who 
knew about problems were afraid of the consequences of coming forward; if 
employees were statutorily protected against retaliation, they would be more 
willing to speak out.
209
  However, whistleblowers did not initially rely on the 
statutes because they provided no meaningful remedies.  Thus, those who 
had lost jobs or suffered other detriment opted to sue under the common law 
theories, especially wrongful firing in violation of public policy, which 
allowed for punitive damages.
210
  Further, the initial presumption may be 
wrong; as noted earlier in this article, social science studies report that factors 
other than fear of retaliation are important in deciding whether to report.
211
  
Some of these factors include the perceived need for strong evidence, the 
seriousness of the wrongdoing, the perceived likelihood that managers 
would listen and that the problem would be corrected, clear reporting 
channels, and an organizational atmosphere of openness that encourages 
voice.
212
 
Statutory protection for whistleblowers rapidly grew in the late 1980’s 
and 1990’s, especially after legislators saw the efficacy of giving large 
rewards for information that could help governments recover wrongfully-
claimed funds, conserve law enforcement resources, and stop wrongdoing 
earlier.
213
  A key occurrence spurring the widespread adoption of 
whistleblowing legislation was the revision of the False Claims Act (FCA) 
in 1986.
214
  The revised FCA allows a whistleblower to bring suit in the name 
 
(describing why legislators encourage whistleblowing). 
 208. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State 
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 105-06 (2000) [hereinafter The State of State 
Whistleblowers] (determining that whistleblower protection statutes appeared at the same 
time as the erosion of the employment at-will doctrine). 
 209. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They 
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241 (1987) (describing the impact of changes in the law on 
whistleblowing and concluding that statutes meant to encourage whistleblowing do not have 
their intended effect). 
 210. Id. at 241-47. 
 211. See Marcia Parmerlee Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationship Among Beliefs, 
Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27 ACAD. OF 
MGMT. J. 687, 701 (1984) (profiling both whistleblowers and non-whistleblowers and 
concluding that non-whistleblowers generally do not believe that speaking up is worth risking 
their careers and do not trust whistleblower protections). 
 212. Marcia A. Parmerlee et al., Correlates of Whistle-Blowers’ Perceptions of 
Organizational Retaliation, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 17, 27-31 (1982). 
 213. Bishara et al., supra note 207, at 39.  Another possible advantage is self-monitoring 
if people are aware they may be reported for wrongdoing.  Id. at 39-40. 
 214. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012) (defining liability for false claims acts).  The Act 
was originally enacted in 1863 in response to contractors cheating the government during the 
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of the government to recover wrongfully claimed federal funds, even if the 
government itself does not bring suit.  If the information provided is new 
(unknown to the government) and leads to a recovery, the whistleblower can 
receive up to 30% of what is collected by the government.
215
  Since such 
fraud usually involves large sums of money,
216
 many successful 
whistleblowers become millionaires.
217
  Whistleblowing suits under the FCA 
increased from an average of six per year pre-amendments,
218
 to over 450 in 
1998, and to thousands now.
219
  Indeed, a recent five-week period was 
declared to be a record period for FCA whistleblower recoveries, resulting 
in about $500 million recovered by the government.
220
  In fraud involving 
Medicare alone, the government has recovered $5.5 billion from 2007 to 
2016.
221
  While the increase in reward size clearly was important in 
generating reports, in part because it helps balance out the risks of 
whistleblowing,
222
 other changes also contributed to the success.  These 
 
Civil War.  By the 1980s, it had fallen into disuse.  See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and 
Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. J. 1757, 1769 (2007) [hereinafter SOX and Whistleblowing] 
(detailing the history of the FCA). 
 215. 31 U.S.C. §3730 (d)(1)-(2) (2010). 
 216. The fraud was estimated to be around $100 billion per year or more in the last decade.  
Fines are assessed and recovery amounts can be triple, which leads to the large awards.  
Originally, the suits tended to involve defense contracting.  Now, the focus has shifted to 
Medicare and other health fraud.  Most cases end in settlements.  SOX and Whistleblowing, 
supra note 214, at 1769. 
 217. See The State of State Whistleblowers, supra note 208, at 101 (noting that the FCA 
has made millionaires of most of the successful whistleblowers); Qui Tam Statistics, 12 FCA 
& QUI TAM Q. REV. 41 (1998) (demonstrating that the whistleblower award has increased 
since 1998); Fraud Statistics – Overview, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 23, 2013), https://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2013/12/26/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/37CV-AX3G] [hereinafter Fraud Statistics]  (analyzing settlements, 
judgments, and relator share awards from 1987 to 2013). 
 218. Steve France, The Private War on Pentagon Fraud, 76 A.B.A. J. 46, 48 (1990). 
 219. Fraud Statistics – Overview, supra note 217, at 1. 
 220. Record Period for Whistleblower Recoveries, CONSTANTINE CANNON (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://constantinecannon.com/whistleblower/record-period-whistleblower-
recoveries#V7soPdKANBc [https://perma.cc/KX78-SV62] [hereinafter Record Period] 
(stating there were twenty-three recoveries from June 27, 2016 to August 1, 2016, involving 
a variety of false claims of multiple medical-related issues, financial fraud, government 
contracting, grant, and customs fraud; and that most FCA recoveries involve settlements). 
221.     See The Editorial Board, Fraud and Other Threats to Medicare, N.Y. TIMES (July 28,  
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/opinion/fraud-and-other-threats-to-medicare.ht
ml? _r=0 [https:// perma.cc/72TB-DJZD] (stating that, in its nine-year history, the Medicare 
Fraud Strike Force, an alliance for combined action among local, state and federal agencies, 
has garnered information resulting in over 2,000 convictions, mostly resulting in prison terms; 
arguing also that stopping fraud results in better care because medical fraud frequently 
includes obtaining tests that are not needed). 
 222.  A study by the University of Chicago and Toronto University reported that in 
industries covered by the FCA, employees were substantially more likely to report major 
frauds than those in areas not covered.  See Alexander Dyke et al., Who Blows the Whistle on 
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include increased certainty that an award would be made, the extension of 
the statute of limitations, guaranteed participation in the process, and the 
development of a well-developed bar specializing in FCA claims.
223
 
The success of the FCA in recovering government funds has resulted in 
a proliferation of reward legislation at both the federal and state levels.  
However, for a variety of reasons, these state and federal laws have not been 
as successful as the FCA.
224
  Crises caused by financial and corporate wrong
doing led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002
225
 and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010.
226
  Both 
laws provide important protections and significant financial reward 
incentives for whistleblowers.
227
  These statutes have also been successful in 
generating reports and recoveries.
228
  The passage of the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005, designed to combat Medicaid Fraud, gave states an additional 
financial incentive to pass FCA-type legislation, and many more have done 
so.
229
  Success under the FCA also led the Internal Revenue Service to revise 
its reward program in order to help recover unreported or underreported 
taxes.
230
  The revisions again have led to huge increases in reports and some 
 
Corporate Fraud, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2215 (2010). 
 223. See Elleta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: 
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 278-
83 (1992) [hereinafter Get Rich] (detailing how various statutes have created important 
financial incentives to encourage whistleblowing). 
 224. See SOX and Whistleblowing, supra note 214, at 1764–73 (describing the inadequacy 
of various whistleblower protections); Bishara et al, supra note 207, at 56 (noting that the 
success of whistleblower protections has been met with resistance due to the complicated 
nature of the claims, judicial decisions, and statutory features). 
 225. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. II 2002). 
 226.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010). 
 227. See Whistleblower Awards Top $100 Million, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/page/whistleblower-100million [https://perma.cc/438V-GMLT] (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2016) (pointing out that the SEC has paid over $100 million to 
whistleblowers from 2013 to 2016, with the largest award being $30 million). 
 228.  See Bishara, et al., supra note 207, at 49-50 (discussing that some states even allow 
the whistleblower to collect more than the 30% allowed under the FCA); Cal. Gov. Code § 
12652(g) (2012) (allowing for a collection of up to 50% of the amount recovered by the 
government). 
 229. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b (2006) (requiring State governments to carry some of the 
burden of Medicaid costs and incentivizing them to pass FCA-type legislation) (current 
version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(b) (2015)). 
 230. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(1), 120 Stat. 
2922, 2958-59 (2006).  The amount of the “tax gap” was estimated to be $385 million in 2014.  
See Denise M. Farag & Terry Morehead Dworkin, A Taxing Process: Whistleblowing Under 
the I.R.S. Reward Program, 26 S. L.J. 19, 20 (2016) (discussing that the amount of the “tax 
gap” was estimated to be $385 million in 2014); id. at 43-44 (explaining that the recoveries 
under the IRS program have taken a long time between the report and the recovery). 
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significant recoveries.  In August 2016, two whistleblowers recovered $17.8 
million for reporting on a Swiss bank that helped U.S. taxpayers hide money 
from the IRS.
231
  The case is important in another regard:  The U.S. Tax 
Court, for the first time, allowed the award to include part of the criminal 
fines and civil forfeitures collected from the bank.
232
  States have also 
observed the success of rewards, and in times of financial need have passed 
FCA-type laws.
233
 
Whistleblowing legislation covering a wide variety of areas exists 
outside the reward structure.  Today, all states have some form of 
whistleblower statutory protection and many states have several statutes.
234
  
Numerous measures have also been enacted on the federal level.
235
  
Additionally, courts have extended whistleblower protection under statutes 
not specifically passed to protect whistleblowers,
236
 and federal employees 
are protected under the Civil Service Reform Act and its numerous 
revisions.
237
  Despite all the legislation, there is no general whistleblower 
protection, and employees can “fall through the cracks” and not be protected.  
Thus, new whistleblower legislation and protections are being proposed and 
passed.
238
 
 
 231. Record Period, supra note 220, at 1. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See, e.g., Indiana False Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act, IND. CODE § 5-11-
5.5 (West Supp. 2007) (defining the necessary elements for false claims and whistleblower 
protection); Michigan Medicaid False Claim Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 400.601-400.615 
(1977) (describing remedies and penalties for fraudulent acts). 
 234. See The State of State Whistleblowers, supra note 208, 132-175 (listing each state’s 
whistleblower protection laws). 
 235. See Bishara et al., supra note 207, at 40-41 (providing examples of the steps 
legislators have taken to promote protection). 
 236. The State of State Whistleblowers, supra note 208, at 103-04. 
 237. See SOX and Whistleblowing, supra note 214, at 1766-67 (detailing the history and 
objective of the Civil Service Reform Act and the Office of Special Counsel).  Protection for 
federal employees has proved to be particularly problematic.  Government employees also 
have some protections under the Constitution.  See also Pickering v. Bd. Of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 574 (1968) (holding that a teacher’s right to speak with respect to issues of public 
importance cannot be grounds for dismissal).  
 238. See, e.g., CFTC Proposed Regulations Will Protect Whistleblowers and Prohibit Gag 
Clauses, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/cftc-
proposed-regulations-will-protect-whistleblowers-and-prohibit-gag-clauses 
[https://perma.cc/6BSW-RKZE] (writing about proposed regulations, such as §165.19(b), 
which would disallow the use of confidentiality and pre-dispute arbitration clauses in 
employment agreements); A.G. Schneiderman Proposes Bill to Reward and Protect 
Whistleblowers Who Report Financial Crimes, N.Y. ST. OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN. (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-proposes-bill-reward-and-protect-
whistleblowers-who-report-financial [https://perma.cc/C9E7-GL8E] (describing a new 
proposal by AG Eric Schneiderman, which would benefit employees who report illegal 
activity in various industries). 
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B. Efforts to Silence Whistleblowing and Voice 
While legislators,
239
 scholars, and others have recognized the 
importance of employee voice and whistleblowing, business has been 
reluctant to embrace it, despite the fact that intra-organizational disclosures 
can benefit the organization.
240
  The problems at Volkswagen are but one 
current example of failed reporting in the workplace.
241
  Not only do 
businesses not embrace whistleblowing, they often work against it.  With 
their outsized power in contrast to individuals or consumer groups, they are 
succeeding in getting anti-whistleblowing legislation enacted.  Businesses 
also put up barriers to voice within the organization.  Three examples 
illustrate these efforts:  “ag-gag” laws, non-disclosure agreements,
242
 and 
unrealistic performance pressure on employees, exemplified by recent 
disclosures at Wells Fargo. 
1. Ag-Gag Laws 
Perhaps the most active legislative efforts to stifle disclosure involve 
the food production industry.  Legislators in several states have enacted “ag-
gag” laws—laws that prevent employees and other people from using 
undercover tactics to expose cruelty to animals and pollution caused by mega 
 
 239. Senators have proposed that July 30 be designated as Whistleblower Appreciation 
Day because “Congress has an obligation to stand up for individuals who risk their jobs and 
reputations to shine a light on threats to public safety.”  Rudy Takala, Senators Propose 
‘Whistleblower Appreciation Day’, WASH. EXAMINER, June 30, 2016, 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senators-propose-whistleblower-appreciation-
day/article/2595398 [https://perma.cc/XGA2-L3CQ]. 
 240. Bishara et al, supra note 207, at 40.  Internal whistleblowing can be an efficient and 
inexpensive source of information about organizational mistakes and can stop problems 
quicker than if the information has to go outside the organization.  It can also help protect the 
reputation of the organization.  See id. 
 241. See William Boston, Volkswagen’s Legal Battles Heat Up Around the Globe, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 24, 2016, at B1 (describing Volkswagen’s emissions-cheating scandal); Nick 
Kostov, Tougher French Probe of Emissions Is Urged, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2016, at B2 
(finding that manufacturers like Volkswagen and Renault cheat on their laboratory tests). 
 242. Another recent example of stifling voice is a security policy instituted by the 
Arizona House of Representatives requiring extensive background checks on reporters 
before they could get floor privileges.  Access was changed after a reporter publicized a 
lawmaker’s misdeeds.  See Bob Christie, Arizona Rules Restrict Reporters Who Reject 
Background Check, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 8, 2016, at A5 (recounting the House session that 
discussed the rules regarding restriction of access for journalists); Richard Ruelas, Arizona 
House Reverses Stand: Reporters Allowed on House Floor, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Apr. 12, 
2016), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/legislature/2016/04/12/arizona-house-
reverses-stand-reporters-allowed-house-floor/82935632/ [https://perma.cc/W5EF-G8ET] 
(reporting on the change in policy for journalists). 
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livestock operations.
243
  Some individuals get a job at one of these places in 
order to gather evidence of objectionable procedures and practices.  
Exposure can lead to enforcement actions by agencies and backlash from 
consumers against the operators and owners.
244
  Ag-gag statutes vary but 
generally make it a crime to gain unauthorized access to farming operations 
and/or to record or film activities on a farm or agricultural operation unless 
the individuals have the owner’s permission.
245
  States do not put many 
resources into inspection and enforcement.
246
  For example, despite reports 
of cruelty to pigs in Illinois’ 12 million pigs-a-year market, the Illinois 
Bureau of Animal Health and Welfare found no animal welfare violations or 
infractions from 2011 through 2016.
247
  Thus, issues have been successfully 
raised by individuals taking jobs in organizations and secretly recording the 
conditions and abuse.
248
 
 
 243. State Ag-Gag Laws, CONSTANTINE CANNON, 
http://constantinecannon.com/whistleblower/whistleblower-ag-gag-laws 
[https://perma.cc/B3F6-3DR4] (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (defining ag-gag laws); Warren 
Richey, ‘Ag-gag’ Laws Head to Court: So Far, Animal Rights Activists Are Winning, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 31, 2015), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/1231/Ag-gag-laws-head-to-court-So-far-
animal-rights-activists-are-winning [https://perma.cc/BF4P-BWUB].  At least ten states 
have “ag-gag” laws, and others are considering them.  States with laws include Idaho, Iowa, 
Kansas, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.  
Individuals have exposed conditions at a turkey farm, the whipping of cows, confinement of 
hens, and treatment of animals at slaughterhouses.  Many of the undercover videos and 
reports have led to changes, sometimes from big corporations such as McDonalds that buy 
the agricultural products.  See, e.g., Johnathan Chew, Ex-McDonald’s Suppliers Plead 
Guilty to Abusing Chickens, FORTUNE (Oct. 30, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/10/30/mcdonalds-chicken-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/86LB-RJKL] 
(describing the animal cruelty incident associated with McDonald’s poultry providers and 
McDonald’s subsequent pledge to no longer use chicken supplied by such means). 
 244. The chairman of Perdue Farms, one of the largest chicken suppliers in the U.S., is 
now publicizing that, in response to changing consumer tastes and desires, they are stopping 
the use of antibiotics.  They are also going to put chickens to sleep before killing them and 
their goal is to double the activity of their chickens in the next two years by putting 
enhancements in their houses.  Jim Perdue, Chickens Without Antibiotics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
17, 2016, at R10. 
 245. E.g., IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2012) (detailing offenses related to agricultural 
production); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (2014) (imposing penalties upon individuals who 
knowingly interfere with agricultural production). 
 246. See David Jackson & Gary Marx, Whipped, Kicked, Beaten: Illinois Workers 
Describe Abuse of Hogs, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 4, 2016, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/newswatchdog/pork/ct-pig-farms-abuse-met-20160802-
story.html [https://perma.cc/5LNQ-KWWW] (explaining that Illinois has just six inspectors 
for all good animals—including pigs, chickens, and cows—who are responsible for how 
animals are fed, confined, and medicated who also investigate reports of conditions in pet 
stores and petting zoos, among others). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
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North Carolina adopted a law allowing employers to pursue civil 
charges against employees who, by gaining access to the nonpublic areas of 
the employer’s facilities to take pictures, shoot video, or copy data or 
documents, use this information “to breach the person’s duty of loyalty to 
the employer.”
249
  If challenged, it is unlikely to be upheld.  Breach of the 
duty of loyalty was long ago found to be trumped by the public interest in 
whistleblowing.
250
  However, the threat of a lawsuit and possible punitive 
damages of up to $5,000 per day are likely to be a deterrent to employee 
voice until the statute is successfully challenged. 
Idaho was one of the first states to pass “ag-gag” legislation.
251
  The law 
protected large agricultural operations, such as factory farms, by 
criminalizing a common animal abuse and mistreatment whistleblower 
tactic.  The law made it a crime to obtain employment with an agricultural 
production, use force, threat, misrepresentation or trespass to enter an 
agricultural production facility, and obtain records of an agricultural 
production, with the intent to cause economic injury to the facility’s 
operations.
252
  Further, it criminalized entering an agricultural production 
facility not open to the public and, without express consent from the facility’s 
owner, making an audio or video recording of the conduct of the facilities’ 
operations.
253
 
In August, 2015, the Idaho statute was struck down as a violation of the 
Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses.
254
  The judge found the law 
“poses a particularly serious threat to whistleblowers’ free speech rights” and 
circumvents established “whistleblowing statutes by punishing employees 
for publishing true and accurate recordings on matters of public concern.”
255
  
A key determinant in the ruling was the animus shown by legislators who 
compared animal rights activists to “terrorists, persecutors, vigilantes, 
blackmailers, and invading marauders who swarm into foreign territory and 
destroy crops . . . .”
256
 So far, attempts to stifle employee speech and 
 
 249. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (2016). 
 250. See Get Rich, supra note 223, at 333-34 (noting that the duty of loyalty has taken a 
backseat to the protection and rights of employees in the whistleblowing context). 
 251. See IDAHO CODE ANN., supra note 245 (punishing misconduct related to animals and 
agricultural production generally). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1195 (D. Idaho 2015) 
(holding that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated free speech protections and 
equal protection). 
 255. Id. at 1208. 
 256. Id. at 1210.  Wyoming has also enacted “ag-gag” legislation.  WYO. STAT. ANN. §40-
27-101 (2015) (amended 2016).  State legislators received complaints from ranchers about 
environmentalists who went on their land to gather water samples to give to federal and state 
agencies.  Richey, supra note 243.  The trespass statute was then amended to make it illegal 
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whistleblowing have had mixed success.257 
There is another precedent that can be called upon to overturn such 
statutes.  During the Civil Rights era of the 1960s and 1970s, “testers” were 
used to gain evidence of housing and employment discrimination.
258
  For 
example, in employment opportunities, a company would get two resumes 
that were essentially identical except for the name.  When the individuals 
show up for an interview, one is black, and the other is white.  If the employer 
consistently chooses the white person, or tells the black applicant that the job 
has just been filled, etc., that is used as evidence of discrimination.
259
  Most 
courts eventually upheld such evidence despite the argument of lack of 
standing because the person did not really want the job and therefore there 
was no injury.
260
   
 
to trespass on open land and/or private property with the intent to collect “resource data.”  Dan 
Frosch, Wyoming Trespassing Laws Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2016, at A3.  It 
provides for consequential and economic damages as well as recovery of litigation costs.  
WYO. STAT. ANN. §40-27-101 (2015) (amended 2016).  The statute recently survived a 
challenge to its constitutionality under the First Amendment right to free speech.  “The 
Supreme Court ‘has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general 
rights of free speech on property privately owned . . . .’”  W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 
196 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1242 (D. Wyo. 2016).  Other states have taken a different approach.  
Colorado, for example, offers immunity for those who report animal abuse.  COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 18-9-209 (2005).  
257. Indeed, they have even had some negative effects.  For example, a study found that 
“ag-gag” laws eroded trust in farmers and increased support for animal welfare legislation.  
Andrew Amelinckx, New Study Finds “Ag-Gag” Laws Erode Trust in Farmers, MODERN 
FARMER, Mar. 29, 2016, http://modernfarmer.com/2016/03/ag-gag-laws-erode-trust-farmers/ 
[https://perma.cc/87BM-BEWV] (stating that the reaction was as strong among the 
demographic category of rural, conservative omnivores as among the category of urban, 
liberal, vegetarians).  The study also indicated a negative perception of how well farmers are 
taking care of the environment.  An earlier study of members of the cattle industry reported 
that sixty percent of the 500 readers did not think “ag-gag” laws were a good idea to pursue.  
Id.  The study was published in BEEF Magazine.  Id.  Environmental groups and 
photographers were upset by the passage of the Wyoming law, not just animal rights activists.  
The National Press Photographers Association, among others, joined in a suit against it.  
Frosch, supra note 256. 
 258. The tactics are still in use today.  See Daniel Beekman, Landlords Accused of Biased 
Practices, SEATTLE TIMES, May 3, 2016, at B1 (describing potential bias against renters after 
Seattle’s Office for Civil Rights employed “testers” to expose illegal discrimination). 
 259. Similarly, if a white person and a black person, matched as evenly as possible, try to 
rent an apartment and the white person is repeatedly chosen, that is evidence of discrimination. 
See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982) (detailing a specific injury 
exists when a black person is told apartments are not available while a white person is told 
there are vacancies). 
 260. See generally EEOC Notice, Enforcement Guidance: Whether “testers” Can File 
Charges and Litigate Claims of Employment Discrimination, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (May 22, 1996), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/testers.html 
[https://perma.cc/GN5A-EPJL] (establishing the Commission’s position that “testers” may 
file charges and litigate the claims they bring). 
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2. Provisions in Employment Contracts 
One tactic used by employers to stifle whistleblowing is to require 
applicants and employees to sign agreements requiring them to take all 
disputes to arbitration.  Many also require employees to not join class 
actions.  This practice grew after the Supreme Court in Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams
261
 upheld a mandatory arbitration clause in a case involving 
discrimination and tort claims.
262
  These agreements are under attack in 
various ways.
263
  There have been several bills introduced in Congress to 
overturn the Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams ruling, but they have been 
unsuccessful.
264
  The NLRB has taken the position that arbitration 
agreements banning class actions violate federal law guaranteeing the right 
of workers to concerted activity.
265
  The Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau is seeking to ban mandatory arbitration clauses in many types of 
consumer contracts.
266
  The Labor Department has issued a rule that will 
allow investors to file class action lawsuits if they feel financial advisors 
working on retirement accounts are not doing so in the best interests of their 
clients.
267
  In general, however, the agreements are in effect.  The 
 
 261. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, (2001). 
 262. Id. at 113-14 (finding that the Federal Arbitration Act covers not only commercial 
contracts, but employment contracts as well).  Between 2010 and 2014, the courts sent 470 
worker lawsuits to arbitration, a 315 percent increase from the period 2005-2009.  James von 
Bergen, Employee vs. Employer: The Battle Over Arbitration, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 16, 2016, 
at D7. 
 263. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB Proposes Prohibiting 
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of Consumers their Day in Court, (May 05, 
2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-
bureau-proposes-prohibiting-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-consumers-their-
day-court/ [https://perma.cc/Y22F-N98A] (specifying the need for prohibiting mandatory 
arbitration clauses that deny consumers their day in court). 
 264. See Bishara et al, supra note 207, at 106-07 (detailing that many Congressional 
Representatives introduced the Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act, which would 
overturn the decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams). 
 265. See von Bergen, supra note 262 (highlighting the position held by the National Labor 
Relations Board that arbitration agreements that ban class actions violate federal laws 
guaranteeing the right of workers to band together for protected concerted activity). 
 266. See Martha Neil, CFPB Seeks to Ban Mandatory Arbitration of Consumer Disputes 
over Banking, Credit Cards and Loans, A.B.A. J. (May 05, 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/cfpb_seeks_to_ban_mandatory_arbitration_of_ban
king_credit_card_and_mortgage [https://perma.cc/P4B7-GX3Y] (stating that the Bureau has 
passed a rule which will ban mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts). 
 267. See Andrew Ackerman and Leslie Scism, Obama Retirement-Savings Rule Faces 
Industry-Led Court Battle, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/industry-groups-prepare-lawsuit-over-obama-retirement-rule-
1464704230 [https://perma.cc/UHF3-QXFP] (stating that the rule requires financial advisors 
to act as fiduciaries). 
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disadvantage to whistleblowers of mandatory arbitration is that they are 
unlikely to get punitive damages.  This leaves many whistleblowers who 
suffer retaliation in essentially the same place as they were before the 
whistleblower protection statutes were passed.  They cannot sue in tort, and 
the remedies in arbitration are inadequate.  Additionally, employers are 
shielded from publicity about their wrongdoing, so society also suffers; for 
example, by preventing the public from understanding how prevalent certain 
problems and practices are. 
Covenants are used to stifle speech in other ways.  The use of contract 
law to try to suppress employee speech and whistleblowing is not new.  
Brown & Williamson asserted a confidentiality agreement against the main 
tobacco whistleblower in 1995, and Food Lion used similar agreements to 
stop evidence of its practices.
268
  The use of such agreements grew rapidly in 
the 1990s, and today they are almost ubiquitous.  As noted, whistleblowing 
protections also grew rapidly during this period, and today valid 
whistleblowing is generally seen as trumping the interest in keeping the 
information secret when litigated.
269
  This does not mean that organizations 
no longer try to use them to stifle speech.  The threat of a lawsuit can go far 
in keeping someone silent.  It can also keep those who are aware of the 
threatened lawsuit against another person silent. 
Perhaps in recognition of the ultimate futility of enforcing 
confidentiality agreements against whistleblowers, companies are trying to 
bolster their protection through additional agreements.  For example, some 
companies are trying to thwart whistleblowing by requiring employees to 
sign agreements to forgo government whistleblower awards in order to be 
eligible for severance pay or to receive a commission.
270
  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which has recently stressed the importance of 
whistleblower information in helping to ensure protection for the securities 
markets, is investigating these agreements because they create a chilling 
 
 268. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. 
BUS. L. J. 151, 151-52 (1998) (detailing how an employer used a confidentiality agreement 
against a former employee to prevent him from testifying about tobacco industry practices). 
 269. See Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 750, 763 (D. 
N.J. 1976) (determining that it would be improper to enjoin a whistleblower when the 
information they wish to share serves the public interest); see also EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., 
Inc., 929 F. Supp. 512, 518 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting an emerging judicial trend not to allow 
private contractual agreements to thwart the public good), modified, 94 F. 3d 738 (1st Cir. 
1996). 
 270. See Press Release, SEC, Company Punished for Severance Agreements that 
Removed Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing, SEC (Aug 16, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-164.html [https://perma.cc/9WS3-TNX2] 
(declaring a company that required employees to waive their ability to acquire money from 
the SEC’s whistleblower program was fined $340,000). 
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effect on reporting wrongdoing.
271
  A SEC Commissioner called it an 
intimidation through “pre-taliation” rather than through retaliation.
272
  In one 
case, the SEC brought an enforcement action against BlueLinx Holdings for 
requiring outgoing employees to sign severance agreements that said they 
waived their right to monetary recovery if they filed a complaint with the 
SEC or other federal agency.
273
  In another case, it brought action against 
KBR for including improperly restrictive language in confidentiality 
agreements.
274
  It found the company in violation of Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower provisions because the company “required witnesses in 
certain internal investigations interviews to sign confidentiality statements 
with language warning that they could face discipline and even be fired if 
they discussed the matters with outside parties, without the prior approval of 
KBR’s legal department.”
275
 
3. Unrealistic Pressure on Employees: The Wells Fargo Example 
Wells Fargo (Wells) was the king of cross selling among banks.
276
  It 
was also employing a system of high pressure performance management 
reinforcing an aggressive sales culture.
277
  The program strongly pushed 
 
 271.  See Press Release, SEC, SEC: Companies Cannot Stifle Whistleblowers in 
Confidentiality Agreements, SEC (April 1, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-54.html [https://perma.cc/2VWN-XGNT] 
[hereinafter Companies Cannot Stifle Whistleblowers] (detailing the potential of the pre-
notification requirement in the confidentiality agreements and its discouragement effect). 
 272. See Erika Kelton, SEC Hits Back at KBR and Other Corporate Bullies Who 
Threaten Whistleblowers, FORBES, (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2015/04/02/sec-hits-back-at-kbr-and-other-
corporate-bullies-who-threaten-whistleblowers/#54f39f5c1519 [https://perma.cc/3M88-
KMJP] (defining “pre-taliation” as a corporate strategy to preemptively curtail 
whistleblowing through intimidation). 
 273. See Press Release, SEC, Company Paying Penalty for Violating Key Whistleblower 
Protection Rule, SEC (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-
157.html [https://perma.cc/G4LF-E9SV] (specifying how the agreement between BlueLinx 
and its employees forced the employees to choose between possible whistleblower awards or 
their severance pay and other post-employment benefits). 
 274. Companies Cannot Stifle Whistleblowers, supra note 271. 
 275. See id. (stating that KBR agreed to pay $130,000 in settlement and to change the 
wording in its confidentiality agreements). 
 276. See Aaron Back, Wells Fargo’s Questionable Cross-Selling Strategy, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 9, 2016, at B12, http://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargos-questionable-cross-selling-
strategy-1473444334 [https://perma.cc/4G9L-8CKZ] (detailing how Wells Fargo opened 
over half a million credit-card accounts its customers did not want). 
 277. See Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Warned Workers Against Sham 
Accounts, but ‘They Needed a Paycheck’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-warned-workers-
against-fake-accounts-but-they-needed-a-
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employees to sign up customers for credit card accounts, overdraft 
services,
278
 and other types of products.  The pressure was so strong that 
many employees created fake accounts for customers and signed them up for 
things they did not want in order to meet sales goals.
279
  Employees 
reportedly opened around two million credit card accounts which customers 
may not have wanted.
280
 
Several years before the settlement, the issue of fraudulent account 
openings had become internally known and had been the subject of a story 
in the Los Angeles Times.
281
  Wells eventually terminated 5,300 employees 
for improper practices,
282
 held two-day ethics seminars and when the 
wrongdoing continued, encouraged employees to report it.
283
  What Wells 
did not do was change the very aggressive sales targets that led to the 
problem, resulting in the wrongdoing continuing.  Only several days after 
widespread publicity and arranging settlements did Wells announce it was 
revamping its compensation model—and then not until months later did it 
actually do so.
284
 
 
paycheck.html?action=click&contentCollection=DealBook&module=RelatedCoverage&reg
ion=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article [https://perma.cc/6UR2-KL9C] [hereinafter They Needed 
a Paycheck] (proposing that the root cause of the sham accounts was the high sales goals 
and management pushing the goals ever higher). 
 278. See Anna Maria Andriots & Emily Glazer, Wells Pushed Overdraft Services, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 11, 2016, at C1 (expounding how a regulation was passed in 2010 which required 
banks to get customer permission for overdraft protection so the banks developed possibly 
shady means to get said permission and subsequent fees). 
 279. See Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Fined for Sales Scam, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2016, at 
A1 (stating that Well Fargo was hit with a $185 million fine for opening as many as 2 million 
debit and credit-card accounts without customer approval).  Employees also allegedly 
transferred funds from authorized customer accounts to temporarily fund ones without 
customer permission, sometimes resulting in fees for insufficient funds for the customer.  
They also issued debit cards and assigned personal ID numbers without the customer’s 
knowledge.  Id. 
 280.  Id.  The fine Wells Fargo is paying in settlement is in part for opening those accounts.  
Id.  
 281. See Brady Mullins, et al., How the Scandal Unfolded, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2016, at 
A8 (noting an investigation in the Los Angeles Times).  Whistleblowers had come forward 
with information about the wrongdoing, but the government allegedly failed to investigate it.  
See Liz Wagner & Mark Villareal, Former Federal Investigator Says Government Didn’t 
Investigate Wells Fargo Whistleblower Cases, NBC BAY AREA (Oct. 18, 2016), 
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Former-Federal-Investigator-Says-Government-
Didnt-Investigate-Wells-Fargo-Whistleblower-Cases-397518261.html 
[https://perma.cc/E8US-MB7J] (detailing how two employees sent complaints to the 
Whistleblower Protection Program under OSHA and the complaints went uninvestigated). 
 282. See They Needed a Paycheck, supra note 277 (detailing the number of number of 
employees who lost their jobs). 
 283. See id. (describing measures taken by Wells Fargo to address the issues it was facing). 
 284. See id. (highlighting the change in compensation structure to deemphasize hitting 
sales goals). 
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Even further, the Chief Executive of Wells, John Stumpf, blamed the 
staff for the wrongdoing.
285
  Wells may have provided avenues for 
whistleblowing and instructed employees as to what wrongdoing the 
executives were most concerned with, but not changing the incentives and 
pushing the responsibility for the wrongdoing to the lowest levels by the 
CEO did nothing to build the trust necessary to encourage voice.  In fact, one 
could argue that it did just the opposite—provided an organizationally-
sanctioned incentive for silence. 
The fallout from the company’s actions continues.  Wells has agreed to 
pay a $185 million fine in settlement with the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau
286
 and has also settled with the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency and the City Attorney of Los Angeles.
287
  It is under investigation 
by Congress and at least three states.
288
  Wells’ stock price has fallen, the 
chairman and CEO has resigned,
289
 and customer applications for credit 
cards and checking accounts have fallen by twenty and twenty-five percent, 
respectively.
290
 
Misconduct, like that of Wells Fargo’s, is a “systemic risk” in the 
financial and banking industries.
291
  To properly mitigate this risk, companies 
 
 285. See Emily Glazer and Christina Rexrode, Wells Boss Says Staff at Fault for Scams, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2016, at A1 (noting the top two bankers at the bank blamed the rank 
and file staff members for the scandal). 
 286. See They Needed a Paycheck, supra note 277 (stating the penalty assessed against 
Wells Fargo for their behavior).  The fine is the largest ever assessed by the CFPB.  Alistar 
Gray, Record Fine for Wells Fargo After Staff Set Up Secret Accounts to Hit Sales Goals, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2016, at 1. 
 287. See Yuka Hayashi, Wells Fargo Is Getting Heat, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17 - 18, 2016, at 
B2 (describing the settlement with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). 
 288. See id. (noting that California also is investigating Wells for identity theft); James 
Rufus Koren, California Attorney General Investigating Wells Fargo on Allegations of 
Criminal Identity Theft, LA TIMES, Oct. 18, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
wells-fargo-harris-20161018-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/KZ9A-L6BZ] (pointing at the 
creation of unauthorized accounts as criminal identity theft). 
 289. See Emily Glazer, Wells Chief Quits Under Attack, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2016, at A1 
(stating the CEO has resigned). 
 290. See Aaron Back, Wells Fargo Enters Fog of Uncertainty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 
2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-enters-fog-of-uncertainty-1476468212 
[https://perma.cc/P62M-SRA9] (noting a twenty-five percent slump in new checking 
accounts being opened and a twenty percent slump in new credit cards when compared to 
the prior year). 
 291. See Julia-Ambra Verlaine, Carney: Misconduct Is a ‘Systemic Risk’, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 1, 2016, at C3 (stating the frequency of banking misconduct can lead to great systemic 
risk in financial institutions and markets).  After bringing charges against Wells Fargo, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has asked large and regional banks for information 
about their incentive compensation and sales practices.  See Emily Glazer & Christina 
Rexrode, Banks Sales Draw Inquiry, WALL ST. J., October 26, 2016, at C3 (describing the 
OCC’s interest in formally getting the large and midsize banks’ sales practices). 
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need employees to speak up.  But before they will, they must have some 
investment and trust in the organization.  Rather than set unrealistic goals 
and routinely get rid of employees who do not meet them, it would be far 
better to lead with buy-in from below, and encourage rather than punish. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR WORKPLACE PRACTICES 
At-will employment as well as ag-gag legislation and contractual 
provisions requiring arbitration for the resolution of all disputes are external 
forces that disincentivize the exercise of employee voice.  Because a 
meaningful opportunity to have voice in the workplace is important to 
employees, the employer, and society, external barriers that may make 
employee voice less likely should be countered with internal processes and 
practices that are aimed at facilitating upward communication of concerns 
by employees. There are several actions employers can take to encourage 
employees to speak up. 
A first step in promoting employee voice is to have strong statements 
and support from top management encouraging employees to raise their 
concerns and stressing a non-retaliation policy.  This should have a 
prominent place in materials provided to new hires, and it should also be 
republished annually to all employees.
292
  To bolster the company’s policy, 
there should be a summary of activity in that annual message and details 
regarding how various issues brought to the attention of management were 
resolved.
293
  It should also include measures taken against those who 
retaliated against employees who reported.  Training should include what the 
organization considers wrongful and how to deal with it. 
Furthermore, someone high in the organization should be appointed to 
monitor the reporting system.  There should be more than one reporting 
channel in case one of the designated monitors is involved in the 
wrongdoing.
294
  Many companies have established hot lines to receive 
 
 292. See Marcia Miceli et al, A Word to the Wise: How Managers and Policy-Makers can 
Encourage Employees to Report Wrongdoing, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 383-85 (2008) 
[hereinafter A Word to the Wise] (explaining the importance of training on raising concerns, 
avoiding retaliation, and realizing when retaliation is occurring). 
 293. For example, this could be done by category—e.g., 250 issues were raised regarding 
disputes between coworkers or dissatisfaction with supervisor actions (studies have shown 
that these kinds of “personnel” issues are the most common kinds raised).  Co-worker disputes 
were mediated, and X percent were resolved to the parties’ satisfaction.  Also, X percent were 
still in discussion.   
 294. See A Word to the Wise, supra note 292, at 388 (explaining the importance of 
multiple, effective communication channels).  There is likely to be such a system in place in 
larger organizations because this an EEOC best practice for sexual harassment legal 
compliance.  See Best Practices For Employers and Human Resources/EEO Professionals, 
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
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reports in response to SOX.
295
  The presumed advantage of this is anonymity 
for the whistleblower.
296
  Investigation of complaints should be swift and 
thorough.  To the extent possible, the identity of the reporter should be 
protected, if so requested.  The reporter should be kept informed of what is 
going on, including the result of the investigation.  Measures taken against a 
retaliator should be commensurate with the retaliation. 
In addition, the employer should incentivize employees to report 
wrongdoing.  This need not be monetary.
297
  Building incentives into the 
organization’s reward structure may help the employer avoid the detriments 
of external whistleblowing.
298
  “[O]bservers of wrongdoing consider the 
costs and benefits of acting, along with other factors.  The simplest 
interpretation of motivational theory would suggest that providing valued 
employer rewards for internal whistle-blowing would increase its frequency 
. . . .”
299
  It would also emphasize the employer’s desire for the activity.  For 
example, sharing stories of how an individual who helped the organization 
address a problem got promoted would help employees see that speaking up 
about problems was valued in the organization. 
An organization can have the best procedures and guidelines in place 
but without another feature—trust—they will not be used.  Employees must 
trust that if they report, they will be taken seriously, something will be done, 
and negative consequences will not follow.  To increase the probability that 
employees will “trust” their managers to respond positively to their concerns, 
it may be helpful to train managers on the causes and consequences of 
employee silence so that they have more empathy for their employees’ 
worries about speaking up.  It may also be helpful to train managers on how 
to respond when an employee speaks up about a problem or concern. If 
 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/bestpractices-employers.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/Y9L5-F8MV] (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (detailing the complaint process).  
SOX has also made the adoption of established whistleblowing mechanisms necessary for 
all publicly traded companies.  15 U.S.C. §78j-1. 
 295. See SOX and Whistleblowing, supra note 214, at 1761 (“[T]he organizational 
response to this requirement has been to contract with an independent hotline company to 
receive the reports.”); see also A Word to the Wise, supra note 292, at 388 (noting the 
existence of international hotlines for anonymous whistleblowing). 
 296. See A Word to the Wise, supra note 292, at 387-89 (describing how one of the 
obstacles to employees internally blowing the whistle is lack of trust and fear or retaliation, 
and how anonymity can help solve those hurdles). 
 297. While large monetary awards have resulted in an increase whistleblowing, see 
discussion of the False Claims Act and its progeny above, something as simple as a prime 
parking space with the employee’s name on it could reinforce the message. 
 298. A Word to the Wise, supra note 292, at 380 (describing the benefits of internal 
whistleblowing, including saving the firm’s reputation and protection from legal and 
legislative responses to the wrongdoing).  
 299. Id. at 386. 
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managers are trained on what to do with information that suggests a need to 
take action, formal whistleblowing may not be needed.
300
 
The rethinking of raises and bonuses can also encourage voice.  For 
example, an employee who saves the company money through reporting that 
leads to the uncovering of embezzlement, could be given a percentage of the 
savings as a bonus.
301
  Information about illegal activity that helps stop it has 
many benefits to the company, some intangible, such as avoidance of 
negative publicity.  This is also worthy of a monetary award.  This person 
could also be identified as a valuable employee through a monthly 
assessment, and cited as someone who should move forward.
302
  Many 
companies already give incentives for useful suggestions,
303
 and the monthly 
meetings may be a more regularized way of capturing the information if 
suggestions are solicited and rewarded. 
CONCLUSION 
Increased opportunities for employees to voice their concerns in the 
workplace may result in increased job satisfaction and increased employee 
retention.  The increased sense of control associated with employee voice is 
also linked to other positive outcomes such as increased physical and 
psychological well-being.For these reasons, it is paramount that 
organizations find ways to facilitate employee voice. 
To facilitate voice in the workplace, managers should create policies 
and structures that facilitate employees’ sense of belonging and commitment 
to the well-being of the organization.
304
  Employees should also be incenti
vized to “speak up” about issues or problems they encounter in the workplace 
so as to overcome the perceived structural barriers to voice and the perceived 
risks of whistleblowing.  Any attempt to increase worker voice and whistle
blowing should be done carefully and thoroughly, as these changes, if 
improperly implemented, can lead to even more silence and wrongdoing. 
 
 300. See Lauren Weber, At Kimberly-Clark, ‘Dead Wood’ Workers Have Nowhere to 
Hide, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2016, at A1 (explaining that Kimberly-Clark provides training 
sessions on giving and receiving difficult feedback). 
 301. See A Word to the Wise, supra note 292, at 385-86 (detailing one way to incentivize 
whistleblowing). 
 302. See, e.g., Rachel Emma Silverman, Companies Rethink Annual Pay Raises, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 23, 2016, at B6 (stating that the Chief Executive of BetterWorks reviews 
employee compensation every month and makes adjustments if necessary). 
 303. See J.B. Arthur & C.L. Huntley, Ramping up the Organizational Learning Curve: 
Assessing the Impact of Deliberate Learning on Organizational Performance Under 
Gainsharing, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1159, 1159 (2005) (examining the relationship between 
gainsharing and helpful suggestions). 
 304. See Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 180 (highlighting the need for an 
internal sense of commitment to improvement and assistance). 
